Please complete by 9:00PM PST. That is in 9 hours from now.
Should be done in IRAC format as attatched, and please look at sample answers.
does not have to be long answers. Just straight to the point.
CHAPTER 18 Q 4
The McCartheys controlled Salt Lake city’s largest daily newspaper, The Salt Lake Tribune, through their collective ownership of shares in the KearnsTribune Corporation (“KT”), a holding company for the newspaper. In 1997, KT merged with Telecommunications, Inc. (TCI). The McCarthy’s originally opposed the merger but later agreed to it. In 1999, TCI and AT&T merged, and AT&T sold the Tribune to MediaNews in 2001. The McCarthy’s argue that according to an oral agreement reached in 1997, at the time of the original merger that they opposed, the McCarthy’s have the opportunity to buy back the Tribune, after 5 years (in 2002) for a fair market price but that MediaNews tried to block any attempt at a sale. The McCarthy’s filed suit to enforce the oral agreement. MediaNews moved for a declaratory judgment that the McCarthys have no independent rights in the Tribune. The district court granted the defendants motions as to all claims. The McCarthys appealed. Under what conditions would the McCarthys claim be successful? As a judge, what evidence would help you decide whether the oral agreement constituted a valid contract? [MediaNews Group, Inc. v. McCarthy, 494 F.3d 1254 (2007).]
CHAPTER 18 Q 9
Robert Reiss quit his job in Kansas and moved his family to Arkansas, where he began to work as a meat-cutter for Country Corner Food & Drug, Inc. Reiss’s wife was pregnant at the time he began to work for Country Corner, so he discussed the provisions of family insurance with his employer, who allegedly agreed to provide insurance for all family members, including the baby. After Reiss’s son was born, the child experienced health problems and spent some time in the hospital. After Reiss requested that his employer assume responsibility for the medical bills, Reiss was terminated. Reiss brought suit against Country Corner for breach of contract and compensation for medical expenses. Because the employment contract was never in writing, Country Corner claimed that the contract was unenforceable under the statute of frauds. In response, Reiss claimed that the statute of frauds did not apply because the employment was for an indefinite duration and that, even if the statute applied, the exception of promissory estoppel should apply because Reiss relied to his detriment on his employer’s promises. According to the court, which argument was most consistent with the principles of the statute of frauds? [Country Corner Food & Drug, Inc. v. Reiss, 1987 Ark. App. LEXIS 2586.]
CHAPTER 18 Q 10
Benito Brino owned real property that he leased to Salvatore and Linda Gabriele. During the lease, the Gabrieles attempted to purchase the property from Brino. Both parties agreed on a purchase price of $565,000 with a closing date of September 15, 2001. However, the Gabrieles were not able to obtain the full amount in loan financing from the bank, so they made a counteroffer to purchase for $450,000, which Brino rejected. The Gabrieles later obtained the full $565,000 from another lending institution and drafted an addendum to the July sales agreement that altered the closing date to May 5, 2002. Brino orally accepted the terms of the agreement, but the document was not signed until May 16, 2002, after the closing date. Consequently, the bank refused to acknowledge the addendum’s validity. Thereafter, the Gabrieles drafted a second sales agreement with the same terms as the July agreement, except that the second agreement did not include a closing date but stated that the effective date would be the signing date. Both parties signed the agreement on June 16, 2002, and the bank accepted the agreement and agreed to provide the loan. The Gabrieles informed Brino that they were ready to close, but Brino did not convey title of the property to the Gabrieles. The Gabrieles brought suit against Brino, seeking specific performance, but Brino argued that the agreement was not enforceable as it did not satisfy the statute of frauds, primarily because the agreement did not designate the seller. In response, the Gabrieles claimed that their obtaining financing was partial performance of the agreement. How did the court resolve this issue with regard to the statute of frauds? [Gabriele v. Brino, 2004 Conn. App. LEXIS 428.]
CHAPTER 20 Q 7
Mantz worked for TruGreen, a lawn care company. He, along with other TrueGreen employees, signed the company’s noncompete, nonsolicitation, and nondisclosure agreements. Mantz quit and went to work for Mower Brothers, a competitor. Other TrueGreen employees followed Mantz to Mower Brothers. TrueGreen sued Mantz and the other employees for the breach of the agreements and Mower Brothers for tortuous interference with contract. What do you think the Utah high court said was the proper measure of damages in such a case? [TrueGreen Companies v. Mower Brothers, Inc., 2008 Utah LEXIS 193 (2008).]
CHAPTER 20 Q 10
Harley-Davidson Motor Company, Inc., received a request from Scott Smith of Harley-Davidson of Seminole County, a dealership located in Fern Park, Florida to approve the sale of that dealership to PowerSports of Seminole County. Harley-Davidson dealers are required to have an on-site owner-operator, and Harley-Davidson requires that new dealer applicants be committed to its business approach. Harley-Davidson also does not allow any of its dealerships to be publicly owned. Harley-Davidson sent letters inquiring about PowerSports’ interest in the dealership and ability to purchase and run it in compliance with Harley-Davidson’s dealer contract and expectations. The letter explained to PowerSport that it could not go public and maintain the dealership, because, under the dealer contract there must be an on-site owner-operator and conformity to the Harley-Davidson business approach. Representatives of PowerSports orally assured Harley-Davidson that PowerSports would focus on the local market, that it would operate an exclusive Harley-Davidson dealership, and that it would not use the PowerSport name in conjunction with the Harley-Davidson name or logo. PowerSport also stated that it would comply with all aspects of the dealership contract. Harley-Davidson representatives approved PowerSports’ request to purchase the dealership. On the day that Harley-Davidson was set to make its decision, PowerSport sent a letter indicating its intentions to take the company public, to shift all of its stores to internet stores, and to sell a variety of brands of motorcycles, including Harley-Davidsons. The letter arrived at Harley-Davidson the day it informed PowerSports of the approval, but Harley-Davidson executives did not receive the letter until the day after they notified PowerSports. Harley-Davidson sued, alleging that PowerSport made fraudulent misrepresentations to obtain approval of a transfer of Harley-Davidson dealership and then immediately breached its contract. Harley-Davidson sought rescission of that approval. The district court ruled in favor of PowerSport, arguing that the equitable remedy sought was innapropriate. How did the court rule on appeal? Why? [Harley-Davidson Motor Company, Inc. v. PowerSports, Inc., 319 F.3d 973 (2003).]