� Submit after completing Units 1 & 2.
1. Choose ONE of the cases that appear in Units 1 & 2 of the Philosophy 333 Study Guide except Case 2. 1. However, please refer to the discussion regarding Case 2.1 in Unit 2, under the heading �Applying Normative Theories to a Moral Situation�, as an example of how to apply moral theories to a case.
2. Clearly state a professional ethics issue that pertains to the case. It is recommended that you state your issue in question form.
3. Choose TWO out of the five moral theories studied in Unit 2, but only one version of Utilitarian theory at most (e.g. not both Act and Rule Utilitarianism).
4. In essay-form, and in one document, apply each of the two theories to the case, focusing on your stated issue, by doing the following:
a. For each theory, provide an explanation of the theories basic approach to moral evaluation and decision-making.
b. Ethically analyze your stated issue using each of the two theories. The idea here is to adopt the strategy of each of the theories to present what you think is a reasonable and balanced ethical analysis of your issue. In doing so, your aims are (i) to show that you understand how the theories work and (ii) to show that you can use them to express the ethical reasoning that should be brought to bear on the issue.
c. For each theory, if you think that it would prescribe a certain resolution or answer to your issue, state that resolution. If you think that the theory would not prescribe a resolution per se but, nevertheless, would offer some insights into how the case and issue should be dealt with, explain the insights it
READ AND ANSWER
The overall aim of the first unit in Philosophy 333 is to teach students enough about the fundamental elements of philosophical ethics that they are able to successfully and enjoyably navigate this course and make the most of its contents. To this end, the main tasks in Unit 1 include:
1. defining key terms, concepts, and labels;
2. explaining relevant distinctions among them;
3. identifying structural elements of reasoning and arguments.
The first four readings in Unit 1 introduce some of the key concepts in the course. Not all of these readings are discussed directly in this Study Guide, but you will find the material in it complements the readings, and vice versa, to form the basis for a sufficient understanding of ethics.
The fifth reading in this unit is “Ethical Education in Accounting: Integrating Rules, Values, and Virtues,” by DomènecMelé. The point of examining a substantive piece this early in the course is threefold. First, it serves as an example of articles in professional ethics and provides a sense of the kinds of writing you will read throughout this course. Second, it demonstrates how one can put to use some of the terms, concepts, labels, distinctions, and strategies that we reviewed in the first part of the unit. Third, it provides an opportunity to sink our teeth into a particular ethical problem – at least insofar as we are able to do so at this point.
Objectives
After completing Unit 1, you should be able to:
1. identify what is studied in the different subdisciplines of ethics, and provide examples of issues that each would address;
2. explain the difference between descriptive morality (or descriptive ethics) and prescriptive morality (or prescriptive ethics);
3. properly use the ethical terms and concepts in this unit;
4. outline the goals and basic structure of ethical reasoning and arguments;
5. list what is required for an ethical argument to be considered valid;
6. form and defend judgments about the acceptability of premises and the validity of ethical arguments;
7. express ethical issues in question form and in ways that precisely capture the ethical problems you intend to address;
8. apply the basic reasoning strategy that is outlined in the Course Manual, with the aim of understanding, clarifying, developing, or presenting an ethical argument;
9. articulate the idea that professionals should practice virtue in addition to following ethical rules
Defining Our Terms
Reading Assignment 1
• Selection from Chapter 1 of The Moral of The Story: An Introduction to Ethics, 5th edition, by Nina Rosenstand, Print Reading File.
In everyday language the terms “ethics” and “morality” are used in various ways and often ambiguously without any problem – we usually understand each other just fine. Indeed, our different usages are at least partly explained by the fact that the terms have multiple meanings. It is also because we tend not to be cognizant of the precise meanings we employ or intend to convey, plus the fact that oral communication in general tends to be imprecise. Our first task, then, is to explain what our terms mean.
Ethics
Ethics is the name of a branch of philosophy that studies morality, that is, the sphere of all that relates to morality or all that falls within the moral domain. The term morality comes from the Latin, moralitas, which translates as manner, character, or proper behaviour. Basically, all ways of being, behaving, acting, and so on that may be associated with moral value (or disvalue) are within the domain of morality.
Like other branches of philosophy, ethics uses reasoning and arguments with the aim of answering questions or problems, also referred to as “issues.” Ethics addresses issues about morality. Since there are several different kinds of problems that can be taken up by ethicists, the general discipline of ethics is further broken down into subdisciplines, according to the main kinds of problems that are raised and addressed. The table below characterizes these subdisciplines and provides a sample question for each one.
Descriptive Ethics aims to answer issues about the moral values that individuals and groups actually possess and live by.
Do people believe that it is morally acceptable to perform dangerous medical experiments on non-human animals?
Moral Psychology aims to answer issues about the nature and development of moral agency, where a moral agent is a being that is capable of being moral and immoral, capable of acting morally and immorally.
At around what age are children capable of making important moral decisions for themselves?
Applied Ethics aims to answer issues about the moral aspects of specific situations.
What should a psychiatrist do when her client discloses an intention to harm another person?
Theoretical Normative Ethics aims to answer issues about how moral values should be determined and how moral decisions should be made.
By what reasoning may we properly determine what is morally right and distinguish this from what is morally wrong?
Meta-Ethics aims to answer issues about the fundamental nature of ethics as a discipline and about the nature of the concepts and methods we employ when we study morality, including the meanings of moral terms and the epistemic status of moral claims.
What does it mean to say of something that it is intrinsically morally valuable?
Professional ethics is an area of study in the subdiscipline of applied ethics, because the main purpose of professional ethics is to reason about and answer moral issues that arise within specific kinds of situations encountered by professionals. When we do professional ethics, however, we also delve into the other subdisciplines. Our main task is to address ethical issues pertaining to the professions, but in doing so, we are inevitably lead to describe moral beliefs that people hold, to consider elements of professionals’ moral psychology, to invoke moral values and defend judgments about the moral status of professionals’ actions and decisions, and to explain what certain moral concepts mean. Ethical subdisciplines are conceptually distinct, and each has its own sort of task, but it is often necessary to incorporate insights provided by more than one of these areas into any given analysis.
Morality
The term morality has three main usages: descriptive, prescriptive, and synonymous with ethics.
1. Descriptive
To say that people live by their morality as a part of their everyday lives is to use the term morality in a descriptive sense; it is to say that individuals and groups have beliefs about what is morally good and morally bad, morally right and morally wrong, and so on, and that, as a matter of fact, they tend to act or try, at least, to act according to these beliefs. Given that people have such beliefs, descriptions of them might include claims about their moral beliefs. “Marnie (is a person who) believes that employers should respect their employees” is a descriptive claim about Marnie, stating the fact that she has a certain moral belief. Sometimes we think of our moral beliefs as idiosyncratic parts of ourselves, while other times we recognize them as part of the collective consciousness of a social subgroup, a society, a culture, etc. The sentence “Canadians believe that all persons, regardless of their social status, deserve equal access to quality health care services” describes Canadians with respect to the fact that a majority hold this belief.
This usage of morality accords with the subdiscipline of descriptive ethics. Descriptive claims describe what exists or, in other words, describe some aspect of reality. Such claims can also describe both actual realities and possible realities. They are empirical claims that pertain to what is or could be, what was or could have been, or what will be or could come about. Often words such as “is,” “was,” and “could” indicate that the claim being made is a descriptive and empirical one, but they don’t always, which is why we need to be aware of precisely what is being claimed in addition to how the claim is being expressed.
2. Prescriptive
Morality is also used in a prescriptive sense, that is, when we prescribe actions, behaviours, character traits, rules, and so on that are taken to be morally good or bad, right or wrong, etc. The prescriptive sense of “morality” pertains to a moral ideal. When we prescribe a moral rule to be followed, we are judging the rule as conducive to good or bad, right or wrong, in relation to a relevant moral ideal. Underlying the prescriptive claim “People should receive equal pay for equal work” is an ideal about fairness that it is morally right to treat people fairly and morally wrong to treat them unfairly. This claim expresses a view about something that is required by the moral ideal of fairness in relation to situations of persons getting paid for the work that they do.
This usage of the word morality accords with the subdiscipline of normative ethics. When a claim states that something is morally required (or recommended, or permitted) it is a prescriptive claim or, in other words, a normative ethical claim. When a question asks about what is morally required (or recommended, or permitted), it is a normative ethical question because it asks what should be prescribed. Words such as “should,” “may,” and “must” often – but not always – indicate a moral prescription or a normative ethical claim or question. Again, we need to understand what is being claimed or asked, but sometimes key words such as these can help us to identify prescriptive claims or questions.
Another feature of prescriptive morality is that it is understood to assume the ideal of universality. Often, if not always, underlying our moral prescriptions is the idea that their requirements would be espoused by all rational beings or persons. In any given situation where someone prescribes a behaviour (or action, trait, and so on), the prescription includes the idea that, compared with alternative behaviours, the behaviour prescribed is one that should be exhibited by any and all rational persons who are in a similar situation. The prescription assumes a universal status. “You should not cause unnecessary harm” is a prescription directed at you in particular, but holds within it the idea that no rational being should cause unnecessary harm. The universality of moral prescriptions serves to emphasize the fact that descriptive morality and prescriptive morality are independent of one another. Prescriptive morality aims to capture aspects of morality that should be followed by all moral agents, regardless of whether or not those agents in fact possess the beliefs that accord with the prescriptions.
3. Synonym for Ethics
The term “morality” is also synonymous with the term “ethics.” Despite their distinct and precise meanings, which have their proper uses, the two terms and their cognates are often used interchangeably. Such usage will appear in our course material, and there is little reason to discourage it. It may be said, for example, that a journalist follows certain moral or certain ethical principles, that an accountant’s ethics or morals are not acceptable, or that an engineer behaves morally or ethically admirably. Using the two terms synonymously is common in ordinary life and in philosophical ethics but is unproblematic so long as we are able to recognize instances where their precise usages are intended.
Amorality
Amorality is another term worth clarifying. In its most common philosophical usage, saying that a person, an action, a situation, or a thing is “amoral” means that moral values do not apply to him, her, or it. Consider a claim that a person is acting amorally. In making this claim, we mean that the action is neither moral nor immoral, but outside of the domain of morality where moral consideration and judgment apply – the action is non-moral.
For example, when a person serves chicken for a meal rather than beef, in most cases he is acting neither morally nor immorally, but amorally. It is not morally significant whether he serves chicken or beef, and a moral evaluation is simply misplaced. This is not to say that such an action could never be one to which moral judgment applies, but in this instance, moral judgment does not sensibly apply. In a different instance where, say, a person serves chicken because some dinner guests are Hindu and believe cattle to be sacred, it would be relevant to bring moral considerations to bear. The host’s action, at least insofar as it is motivated by respect and kindness, is morally good. Whether a situation, an action, or person can properly be described as amoral is often a matter of context and sometimes a matter of debate. It is important, though, to understand what the term amoral means.
Developing a Vocabulary of Moral Terms
The words “respect” and “kindness” are moral terms. They relate to morality and have moral connotations. Of course, there are many, many moral terms in English and in every other language. Some words, respect and kindness among them, are unambiguously moral in that their meanings have inextricable moral connotations; their internal sense reveals them as belonging to the moral domain. Other words, such as “truth,” have multiple meanings in that they sometimes act as moral terms and at others they act as amoral ones. Truth is often cited as a moral value, a morally good thing. We revere truth and espouse moral rules that commend truthtelling or condemn deception. But we also speak of truth in non-moral contexts, such as when we claim that science aims to deliver truth. When we encounter or use words that are ambiguous, we usually determine from their contexts whether or not they are being used as moral terms.
In reasoning about moral matters and constructing moral arguments, it is important that you carefully choose the words and expressions to capture the meanings you intend to convey. We think in moral terms and use them daily, but don’t often attend to their precise meanings and uses. Sometimes it is difficult for us to find the words to express why we think one thing is morally right or another morally wrong. Remember, a moral term is any term/concept with moral connotations, either intrinsically or when used in certain contexts. Having moral terms ready to mind will be useful as you proceed through this course, and collecting such terms in an ongoing list would be a good idea. Here is a start for your list: good, bad, evil, right, wrong, trust, honesty, care, harm, autonomy, virtue, vice, respect, deception, obligation, responsibility, rights, benevolence, justice, loyalty, fairness . . . .
Terms of Engagement in Moral Philosophy
The terms discussed below play prominent roles in morality and moral philosophy and are worth defining clearly.
Moral Responsibility, Praise, Blame, and Supererogation
To have “moral responsibility” is to be morally accountable for one’s actions (or inactions) and their consequences. The praise or blame placed on moral agents is often linked to moral responsibility. When an agent fails to fulfill his responsibilities, he may be justly deemed blameworthy. The corollary is not as straightforward – it may or may not be that an agent is praised when he does fulfill them. The most common view is that fulfilling one’s responsibilities does not mean that one should be praised, but simply that one does what is morally right, what one ought to do. Furthermore, only when an agent acts beyond her responsibilities and surpasses what is morally expected of her – that is, when she acts in a supererogatory way – is she worthy of praise. Many theorists warn against seeing moral responsibility primarily in terms of praise and blame. Moral responsibility is more complex than these two concepts seem to allow, but they do help when trying to understand accountability and responsibility.
Obligations
Moral agents have obligations in that there are things that are morally necessary for them to do (or not to do). If one has an obligation to do X, then one’s doing X is required, from a moral point of view. In one sense the term “obligation” is synonymous with the term “duty”. Saying that one has an obligation to X means that X is a duty or an obligation that one has. Suppose X stands for “tell the truth.” It is equally correct to say that one has a duty to tell the truth as to say that one has an obligation to tell the truth; the terms mean the same thing and so are interchangeable here. In another sense, an obligation can denote the relation between a moral agent and the moral actions that she must perform. We might say, for example, that one is bound by obligation to tell the truth. Thus an obligation is a duty – both words specify the content of morally necessary action – but an obligation is also the relation between an agent and the action morally required of her.
Moral Rights and Duties
“Moral rights” are entitlements of individuals or groups to be treated in certain morally significant ways or to be provided with certain morally significant benefits. To say that one has a moral right to something is to say that others (perhaps only certain others) are required to provide what is necessary to satisfy that right. In this way, moral rights and moral duties are complementary concepts. Insofar as moral duties are actions (or inactions) that agents are required to perform (as above) or ways that agents are required to be, and moral rights are legitimate or just claims requiring that others perform actions or behave in certain ways, then duties correspond to rights. For example, if I have a duty to care for my children, then my children have a right that I care for them, and vice versa. If you have a right to meaningful employment, then someone (maybe society or the government) has a duty to ensure that you gain meaningful employment. Do you have such a right, though? Many would argue that you do not, and that your claim to meaningful employment is not morally legitimate, that it does not amount to an entitlement, and that it is, in fact, not a right. It may be a desire, an interest, or a preference, but it is not a right – or so the argument would go.
Positive and Negative Rights
Moral rights can be divided into the categories of “positive rights” and “negative rights.” To have a positive right is to have a legitimate claim demanding that someone act so as to satisfy that entitlement. To have a negative right is to have a legitimate claim demanding that someone refrain from acting so as to satisfy that entitlement.
Suppose that Canadians have a moral right to basic healthcare (as some in Canada say we do), then someone has a duty to provide Canadians with basic healthcare (and Canadians take this to be a governmental duty). Basic healthcare is a positive right because someone (like the Canadian government) is required to take active steps to satisfy that right. Similarly, if you did have a legitimate claim to meaningful employment – a right to it – then it would also be a positive right, because someone would have to perform certain actions to help you secure meaningful employment.
Negative rights, by contrast, require only inaction on the part of others. If one has a right to free speech, then it is only required that others not interfere with one’s attempts to speak freely; in other words, others have a duty to permit one to speak. If one has a right to freedom of movement, then others have a duty not to constrain one’s movements. A negative right demands that others refrain from acting; their inaction satisfies one’s entitlement.
Important questions pertaining to rights and duties are: “Is the claim being made a legitimate claim in that it specifies something to which the person is morally entitled? If there is a legitimate entitlement, a right, then who bears the corresponding duty? Is the right claimed a positive or a negative right, and what, specifically, is required of those who must satisfy the right?
By no means do all moral claims specify rights, nor are all moral claims so intended. “Rights claims” are only a subset of the moral claims we assert. The first question is whether one intends to express an entitlement that would bind others to act, or refrain from acting, in certain ways. The second question is whether one’s claim is legitimate. Some claims that are intended to specify rights will be found, upon analysis, to be illegitimate in that the entitlement indicated is not really an entitlement at all. One possibility here, which has made its way into ethical (and legal) debates in recent years, is a claim for the right to have children. Some persons have claimed that, since it is their right to have children, the government and health care system have a duty to provide them (free of charge) with the medical technology to help them to conceive. Whether or not this is a legitimate moral right can be determined only through discussion and debate, since it is, to say the least, a controversial topic.
Prima Facie Duties (or Obligations)
The term “prima facie duty”(or “prima facie obligation”) is often used in moral philosophy to denote a duty that one has, but which may turn out to be overridden by a more pressing or important duty. The Latin prima facie means, basically, “on the face of it” or “at first sight.” On the basis of our “first view” of a situation, we may acknowledge a prima facie duty that an agent in that situation has, but also understand that, once all of the relevant factors of the agent’s situation are taken into account, the duty may have to yield to another one that is more morally significant. A clear example involves a physician on her way to check on her patients in hospital when she witnesses a serious traffic accident. She has a prima facie duty to make her hospital rounds as expected and in a timely fashion. She also has a prima facie duty to provide whatever help she can to the accident victims. Of the two duties, she cannot fulfill both, so one must take precedence. For reasons we would likely all agree upon, the physician’s overriding duty is to help the accident victims. Among the reasons we may use to justify this choice are that care may be more urgently needed by the accident victims, that the physician is likely to be the only health professional nearby, and that the hospitalized patients are surrounded by health care professionals and are not likely to be in need of urgent care anyway. Of the physician’s prima facie duties, one duty emerges as her actual duty, that is, the one that she is obliged to perform at the time, all things considered.
Distinguishing Rules from Principles
There is no one agreed-upon way to distinguish between moral rules and moral principles, and it is not important for our purposes to review all proposed accounts of this distinction. However, it is useful to understand some common ideas for distinguishing between the two, ideas that often lead theorists to refer to certain kinds of moral assertions as rules and other kinds of moral assertions as principles.
Sometimes the term “ethical principles” is reserved for speaking of the most basic building blocks of moral theories (which you will study in the next unit). Moral theories aim to offer strategies for determining moral value and for distinguishing between what is morally good and what is morally bad, and their respective strategies are meant to be all-encompassing in the sense that they are intended to be applicable to any moral situation. As such, some moral theories will offer one or a few fundamental requirements – or principles – from which moral reasoning can proceed. For example, the theory known as “Utilitarianism” offers a single principle according to which, it claims, all moral decisions should be made. This principle is commonly known as “the principle of utility” or “the greatest happiness principle.” It stipulates that the morally right action is always the action that produces either the most happiness or the least unhappiness, when compared with the outcomes of all alternative actions. Other theories offer different types of basic principles.
The label “principle” is applied not only to the fundamental guidelines of full-blown moral theories, however; but moral principles are understood broadly to be more general than moral rules and also more basic or fundamental. Sometimes a single moral concept is taken to express a principle, as when one refers to the principle of justice, or the principle of autonomy, or the principle of charity. These references can be understood as short-forms of assertions such as: “Act according to justice” or “Act justly,” “Respect autonomy,” and “Be charitable.” It is apparent that these are general assertions that prescribe a basic moral approach to acting or a basic moral way to be. They do not specify ways that one could or should satisfy the principles. In their generality, moral principles are open-ended and widely applicable.
The idea that moral principles are more fundamental than moral rules relates to their being general, open-ended, and widely applicable. Since they lend themselves to being expressed through innumerable specific ways, they are taken to be the building blocks upon which more specific moral rules rely. The principle “Act justly” can translate into different rules, depending on the circumstances. For example, in the context of a professor evaluating students’ assignments, this principle could be translated into a rule that asserts, “One should always evaluate students’ work fairly by consistently using clear and objective standards that, when applied, reflect the quality of the work itself.” By contrast, then, moral rules are more specific and less fundamental and, consequently, less open-ended and more narrowly applicable. In philosophy, it is common to say that moral rules “follow from” or “are derived from” moral principles.
Some theorists also think that moral principles are incontrovertible, that is, their legitimacy is not open to dispute, whereas the legitimacy of moral rules is open to dispute. This is not an unreasonable idea, but it is a controversial one. Nevertheless, at the very least, it’s correct that we are less likely to disagree about basic principles than about the specifics of how those principles should be satisfied under particular circumstances. It is hardly contentious to claim that one ought to be charitable, but quite another matter to claim that, as a rule, a professor ought to err on the side of virtue to charitably disregard a student’s suspicious behaviour during an exam!
A reasonable distinction can be made between moral principles and moral rules, however, it is not always clear. There are certainly moral assertions that are neither completely general nor very specific. “One should respect the privacy of others.” Arguably, this prescription is basic, general, open-ended, and widely applicable, but it is moderately, not radically, so because there are even more fundamental reasons why respecting privacy is important and that support the idea that respecting people’s privacy is a good thing to do. The claim for respecting privacy relies, among other things, upon a general commitment to respect persons, as well as upon the principle – or is it a rule? – that one should avoid harming others. In the end, and at least for our purposes, it doesn’t matter. We could simply consider moral prescriptions to occupy a continuum, depicting the most general, open-ended prescriptions, at one extreme, in relation to the most specific and narrowly applicable of prescriptions, at the other. In this way we could acknowledge a grey area where prescriptions are neither clearly principles nor clearly rules. What is important, though, is to understand that some moral assertions rely on others, and those others increasingly possess the characteristics that are commonly attributed to moral principles. The more widely applicable a prescription is, the more basic and, probably, less contestable it is and, so, the more solid a basis it is for moral reasoning.
Building Skills
The trick to moral reasoning is to make logical connections between fundamental moral principles and more specific moral claims and prescriptions so that the more specific ones are adequately supported. How best can one make the necessary connections from general principles such as “Persons are valuable” and “Persons deserve respect” to a moral rule such as “Physicians are responsible for communicating to their patients all information that is relevant to patients’ decision making about treatments.” Between the basic principles and the specific assertion about physicians’ responsibility are claims that one would need to assert and justify in order to appropriately connect the rule to the principle.
For example, the assertion that physicians are responsible for communicating all relevant information to their patients may be supported by the following reasoning, which is expressed as an argument:
premise 1 Persons are intrinsically valuable.
premise 2 Intrinsically valuable things deserve respect.
premise 3 Persons deserve respect.
premise 4 An important part of respecting persons is allowing them to control their own selves and lives.
premise 5 In physician-patient relationships, it is important for physicians to respect patients by allowing them to make autonomous decisions with respect to their own healthcare treatments.
premise 6 In order to make autonomous decisions about their treatments, patients rely on physicians to provide relevant information, which physicians have by virtue of their knowledge, training, and experience.
conclusion Therefore, physicians are responsible for communicating to their patients all information that is relevant to patients’ decision making about treatments.
A general strategy of moral reasoning is to work, logically and systematically, from the least contentious claims (e.g., basic principles) to the most contentious claims (e.g., one’s conclusions, which are often specific moral claims or prescriptions). The reasoning above does this and is explicitly laid out as an argument, that is, with premises and a conclusion.
Moral Arguments in Brief
Arguments consist of premises, more commonly called reasons, and a main conclusion. The argument above about physicians’ responsibility consists of six premises/reasons and one main conclusion. The premises given are meant to work together to support the conclusion. They are meant to so work together, but do they? Do you think that, together, the premises offered adequately support the conclusion? Do you believe the conclusion on the basis of those particular premises?
Barlow, Perry New Yorker Cartoon 9/11/1954 © Perry Barlow/The New Yorker Collection/www.cartoonbank.com
To determine whether a set of premises adequately supports its conclusion, we must look at (a) what is claimed by each premise and whether the claim of each is true or, at least, adequately reasonable, and (b) whether the set of premises as a whole provides adequate support for the truth of the conclusion. What is claimed by each premise is called the premise’s content. How the whole set of premises hangs together to support the conclusion, is the argument’s form. So, before we accept or reject any particular argument and, therefore, believe or disbelieve its conclusion on the basis of its premises, we need to ask whether each premise is at least adequately reasonable and whether the argument has a valid form.
Sometimes it is too much to demand of a premise that it be true, and it is enough to require that it is adequately reasonable. “Adequately reasonable,” here, means that the premise should be accepted without any further support. Whenever we do accept a given premise as true or adequately reasonable, rationality demands that we believe what the premise is claiming, that is, its content. The content of premise 3, above, for example, is persons deserve respect. To accept the premise is to believe that persons deserve respect. Is (the content of) premise 3 true? Or, at least, should it be believed without any further support for it? Many of us would accept this particular premise as true or adequately reasonable; it’s probable that we think of it, in fact, as quite basic or fundamental and so not itself in need of support. We accept it as a belief.
Not everyone would accept premise 3 so readily, however. Some might object that not all persons deserve respect, because respect is something to be earned as well as something that could be revoked. It may be argued, for example, that a person does not herself deserve respect if her behaviour is consistently and radically disrespectful of others. Given this criticism, the question is whether these critics think that premise 3 must be rejected altogether or whether it need only be revised. In this particular case, a suitable revision seems available: “All persons deserve respect unless there is a justified reason to deny them respect.”
It is in precisely this sort of way that the content of premises is critiqued, debated, and sometimes revised – and arguments often become all the stronger for it. If we judge a premise to be neither true nor adequately reasonable, and thus unacceptable, at least as it is, we have two options: (a) we may believe that it is false or (b) we may believe that it should not be accepted without its being further supported by additional reasons. In any case where any premise is judged as unacceptable, it becomes important either for the author of the argument (the “speaker”) to provide further reasons in support of it or for the critic (the “listener”) to provide reasons for its unacceptability. Determining whether it is up to the speaker or the listener to provide further reasons is a matter of attending to the particular premise and its argumentative context. In such cases, there is a further judgment to be made about which party should shoulder the “burden of proof.”
The main thing for our purposes, however, is to understand that, for any given premise, we should either believe it or have good reason to doubt it, and if we doubt it, we must be prepared to show why.
Supposing that each of the premises of a given argument is acceptable, the next step is to judge whether the form of that argument, that is, the way the premises and the conclusion hang together, is valid or invalid. This can be a complicated process, which we need not detail here. The main question to ask is not just whether the conclusion should be believed, but whether it should be believed on the basis of the premises presented. The judgment is whether the given premises, collectively, support the conclusion sufficiently. One might happen to agree with the conclusion, but if one doesn’t think that the reasons offered for it in fact provide sufficient support, then one must, logically, reject the argument. One might, for example, think that all of the premises offered are true, and perhaps that the conclusion is true, but one might also think that the premises do not collectively support the conclusion adequately. Is there a reason that would make the connections between the conclusion and the premises logically complete? If so, then it is up to the critic to explain what is missing. If not, and assuming the acceptability of the given premises, then the set of premises offered should be judged as sufficient support for the main conclusion, and the argument judged valid.
These guidelines for judging the acceptability of premises and the validity of arguments are useful in that they may be applied both to arguments offered by others and those we develop ourselves. When we clearly understand the arguments that others offer, we may use these strategies to systematically assess their validity. Similarly, applying these strategies to our own lines of reasoning helps us to clarify our reasons and arguments for ourselves and to detect any weaknesses in order to fortify them. One need not always present arguments in the manner of the argument above – where the premises are numbered in succession and followed by the conclusion – but this sort of presentation can serve as a useful outline for a more discursive argument or as a heuristic to clarify the key elements of any given argument.
Whitbeck on Moral Reasoning
In her article, “Ethics as Design,” Caroline Whitbeck draws our attention to other aspects of moral reasoning and moral problem solving that are not covered when we look simply to the structure of arguments. Moral problems, she thinks, are too often presented within philosophical ethics as limited scenarios, where one’s possible responses are already contained within the scenario presented. In such cases, our task is to employ moral reasoning by assessing the given responses and judging one of them to be best. Whitbeck’s criticism is that this is not how actual moral problems usually present to us and, so, the reasoning required is not representative of the fullness of moral reasoning we should bring to moral situations. Actual moral problems are not always strict conflicts between competing principles or obligations. In actual situations, moral reasoning and problem solving involve much more than merely judging which of two or more given responses or solutions is the best (or the least bad).[1] By comparing moral problem solving with the kind of problem solving that takes place in the field of engineering design, Whitbeck clarifies for us what more is involved – and what more is important – when we address actual moral problems.
One thing that Whitbeck notes is that an important part of our reasoning about a moral situation takes place at the level of devising the possible solutions or responses that we could bring to a situation. Determining how we could deal with a moral situation – what the possible courses of action are – is an exercise in practical reason, and one that sometimes requires insight and ingenuity. It requires that we begin reasoning about the situation well before we specifically evaluate particular possible solutions. Whitbeck suggests that we should be cognizant of the following: (a) that there may be no one unique solution to the problem, (b) that, indeed, there may be no good solutions at all, but merely better and worse ways of coping with the situation, and (c) that two or more possible responses may be equally good, from a moral point of view, whether we are solving the problem or devising ways to best cope.
Whitbeck’s points are important to keep in mind as you read and write moral analyses in this course. In places, such as in the case study analyses throughout the units and in the moral reasoning strategy explained in the Course Manual, it may seem that she is correct that we do constrain moral reasoning unrealistically. This need not be so, however, if we actively apply her ideas when considering even fictional and tightly circumscribed moral situations. In your reading and writing, imagine these could be real situations (if they are not), and how you would go about reasoning if you found yourself needing to act in those situations.
Unit 2: Normative Ethical Theories
In order to resolve ethical issues we must appeal to values and make value judgments. Our senses or powers of observation alone will not provide the answers to normative ethical questions, even though they will often provide factual information that is relevant to analyzing particular issues. Answering ethical questions necessarily involves our critical capacities, which are fuelled by rational beliefs and, according to some theorists at least, our emotions. Overall, analyzing normative ethical issues is a matter of moving back and forth between the inner workings of our rational selves and the outer workings of the real world or aspects thereof. For any given moral problem, we must think about what precisely the problem is, what moral values are involved, whether there are any specific responsibilities or obligations or rights involved, and so on; and we must reason toward a resolution to the problem by considering reasons for particular resolutions as well as reasons against them. To reason in a productive way, however, we must also look to the facts of the situation as they are manifest in the world around us, and we must understand such things as who is involved and what facts about persons, about society, or about the physical environment are relevant to the problem. Normative analyses consist in arguments that include justificatory reasons or premises, that is, assertions that are meant to justify the judgments and conclusions we make. Normative ethical issues are adequately resolved when, through this critical process of attending to thoughts and values as well as to empirical facts, we arrive at the most defensible moral conclusions possible.
It is worth noting that, in the larger scheme of things, resolution is almost always a collective enterprise in that the most defensible of moral conclusions are reached only when many people work toward them and communicate their individually conceived reasons and conclusions. For example, the question of what form of government is morally best is best answered by putting our heads together. Also, it is an all too familiar fact that, in relation to some moral issues, there continue to be disagreements among rational persons about which conclusions are the most defensible, even when there is considerable collective effort aimed at resolving dilemmas. For example, is voluntary active euthanasia morally acceptable? Still, wherever progress is made, it begins with the sincere efforts of individuals who apply themselves to the task – which is perhaps your most important job in this course.
Fortunately, ethics doesn’t leave us to only our own devices here. Normative ethical theories, the subject of this unit, offer systematic guidance for addressing ethical issues. They provide us with organizing systems that we can use when we turn inwards to draw out and assess relevant values – and, importantly, this includes not only those values that we as individuals espouse, but values that, despite our own personal convictions, could be and should be taken into consideration in our evaluations. The history of ethics, spanning at least 2,500 years, has yielded a few ethical theories that are especially notable either for their substantial time-transcending insights or for their valuably critical and more contemporary insights.
In this unit we examine utilitarianism, Kantian deontology, contractarianism, Aristotelian virtue ethics, and feminist ethics. Some of these theories provide finely tuned decision making frameworks and precise guidelines for dealing with moral matters, while others provide broader ideological frameworks and less exact, but nevertheless useful, guidelines for assessing moral situations. The reading from Rowan and Zinaich is our primary source for coming to understand these theories. It provides informative and sufficiently detailed accounts of each theory, as well as accounts of the main objections lodged against them. Below, the most distinctive aspects of each theory are introduced, and then they are applied to an example. The main objections to each theory are not iterated here, but you should study Rowan and Zinaich’s presentation of them, and be able to apply them wherever the theories themselves may be applied. After we become familiar with the five theories, we will turn to two articles that use them for particular issues in professional ethics. The overall goal in this unit is to bolster our own rational abilities and moral good sense with an understanding of how to apply these theories, which are variously endorsed by professional philosophers and ethicists.
Objectives
After completing Unit 2, you should be able to:
1. explain the main features of each of the following ethical theories and how each one recommends approaching moral decision making:
• Utilitarianism: Act & Rule
• Kantian Deontology
• Contractarianism
• Virtue Ethics
• Feminist Ethics
2. apply each of these theories to ethical situations and explain how each goes about resolving issues posed therein;
3. explain and discuss your own (initial) judgments about the adequacy of each theory studied in this unit and whether one of them is (or some of them are) better than the others for assessing professional ethics dilemmas;
4. discuss the benefits and drawbacks of not limiting ethical analyses to only one of these moral theories but using more than one or perhaps all of them in a pluralistic way to assess moral situations;
5. provide reasons supporting the view that an adequate account of professional responsibility will include reference to the role of moral virtues in professional life in addition to referring to the concepts of rights and duties.
Utilitarianism
Reading Assignment 1
• Chapter 1, Section I. Utilitarian Ethics, pp. 12-21, of Ethics for the Professions, by John Rowan and Samuel Zinaich Jr., Print Reading File.
Utilitarianism is both a teleological approach to morality and a consequentialist approach to morality. It is teleological in that it looks to the end or purpose of behaviour in order to determine the moral status of that behaviour as good or bad, right or wrong, desirable or undesirable, and so on. The Greek word telos means “end,” “purpose” or “goal.” Utilitarianism is consequentialist in that it maintains that the moral status of an action is a function of certain features of the action’s consequences. Utilitarians, and specifically, ActUtilitarians maintain that an action is morally good (or right) if it produces more overall good or less overall bad than would any alternative action. Given one’s options for acting, the right action (i.e., the action that should be performed) is the action that either maximizes good consequences or minimizes bad ones. Historically, good consequences are conceived of as those that promote happiness and bad consequences as ones that detract from happiness. Maximizing happiness or, at least, minimizing unhappiness, is the proper goal of morally correct action. This idea is expressed in utilitarianism’s foundational moral principle – classically referred to as the Greatest Happiness Principle: “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.”[1]
We cannot properly appreciate the import of this basic utilitarian principle, however, unless we understand its presumption about whose happiness counts. Utilitarianism (both Act and Rule, which are distinguished below) specifies that the happiness and unhappiness that must be taken into account is not just that of the person performing the action, that is, the agent, and is not even just that of the agent together with those others who are directly involved with or affected by the action. Utilitarians contend that, in distinguishing the morally right action from its alternatives, which are by fiat morally wrong, we must consider the happiness ofeveryone who is affected by the action. Whose happiness matters? The happiness that matters is that of allpersons who are affected, for better or for worse, by the action – perhaps even that of society itself or humanity itself, depending on the action. This requirement is given expression within utilitarianism by Jeremy Bentham as follows: “each to count for one, and none for more than one.”[2]
Although you will need to study our primary reading to fully understand how this principle is meant to play out within utilitarian calculations, it is useful to note that this requirement is intended to secure actualequality among beings we recognize as ideally equal. We tend to preach that all persons are equal, but this isn’t always what we practice. If you are the agent who is trying to determine which of your available courses of action you should take, then you are not permitted, on utilitarian grounds, to favour your own interests or the interests of those with whom you are emotionally or otherwise affiliated. Your job as a moral agent is to act to maximize happiness or minimize unhappiness for the overall collective of persons who have an interest in the outcomes of your action. By means of this requirement of eliminating partisan considerations from our moral decision making, utilitarians aim to ensure that we practice the equality that we preach.
Weber, Robert New Yorker Cartoon 8/12/2002 © Robert Weber/The New Yorker Collection/www.cartoonbank.com
In response to criticisms of utilitarian theory, some utilitarians developed a different theory, which has become known as “rule utilitarianism,” and the classic form of utilitarian theory described above became known as “act utilitarianism.” Rule utilitarianism differs from the original in that it judges actions to be good or bad, right or wrong, and so on, on the basis of whether those actions accord with a rule specifying that actions of that type tend to maximize happiness or minimize unhappiness. The Greatest Happiness Principle, within rule utilitarianism, applies not to individual actions, but to types of actions. For example, instead of determining the moral status of a particular action of, say, telling a falsehood, on the basis of whether or not it produces more overall happiness than would its alternative (not telling the falsehood) rule utilitarianism determines the moral status of a particular act of telling a falsehood on the basis of whether acts of telling falsehoods generally promote more happiness than do acts of not telling falsehoods. Wherever there are types of actions that, overall, tend to promote happiness or diminish unhappiness, then general rules can supply the needed guidance, and we need not attend to every individual action to determine its rightness or wrongness. These are the rules that we should follow. In this, rule utilitarianism leaves open the possibility that a particular action, such as telling a falsehood, would in fact maximize happiness, even though it is of a type that generally does not do so. Given that it is not of a type that is generally morally right, it is not right in any instance, even if it would, in that instance, maximize happiness.
Kantian Deontology
Reading Assignment 2
• Chapter 1, Section II. Deontological Ethics, pp. 22-35, of Ethics for the Professions, by John Rowan and Samuel Zinaich Jr., Print Reading File.
Deontological ethical theories approach moral problems from a very different direction than do utilitarian theories. The Greek word deon means “duty,” so deontological theories understand morally right action to be action that is motivated by a commitment to duty. Among deontologists, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is the most famous and influential, and we will focus on his theory here. Kant’s highly developed ethics provides the first detailed deontological account of ethics, which is known for its unyielding moral requirements.
Kant claims that consequences are irrelevant to ethical rightness and wrongness. He recognized that good consequences (and bad ones) can issue from actions by accident, and thought that this should not elicit our praise (or blame). Although actions that promote good consequences might be good in some sense (e.g., practically good) they are not morally good. We shouldn’t say, for example, that a person has done a morally praiseworthy thing when she mistakenly grabs an infant instead of her handbag while fleeing a fire, and thereby saves the infant’s life. According to Kant, what matters morally speaking is that agents act as a matter of fulfilling their duty, since to act from duty is, in Kant’s terms, to act out of respect for the moral law. But what does he mean? What is the moral law, and how may we come to know it?
Kant claims that we can know what the moral law is and, so, what morality demands of us, by choosing our actions in accordance with a certain fundamental moral principle, which he calls the “Categorical Imperative.” The Categorical Imperative can be thought of as the essential, fundamental test for determining the morality of any action we might consider performing. When we use the Categorical Imperative to test the moral status of a possible action, and our action passes the test, then we know that our action represents the moral law, reflects our moral duty, and is morally right. The Categorical Imperative, Kant argued, provides us with the correct mechanism for systematically knowing what we should and must do.
Suppose you are considering telling your son falsely that his mother, who left when he was four years old never to return, loved him very much. You know that this isn’t true, but you’re quite sure that your son would never discover the truth (of her deep resentment of him and her frantic escape from motherhood) and that it would be better for him and everyone else if you lied rather than let the truth be known. You are considering acting on what Kant calls a maxim, and your maxim is something like: “I will lie to my son about his mother’s love and thus protect him and perhaps others from the truth.” According to Kant, after formulating a maxim that expresses your considered action, you must generalize your maxim. You would get something like: “Parents should lie to their children about a renegade parent’s love in order to protect these children (and perhaps others).” Next, you are to test this general maxim using Kant’s Categorical Imperative, which states that you must “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”[3] Kant’s requirement of universalizability means that you must consider if it makes sense logically that everyone who might face a maxim such as this could act on it. If you cannot universalize the considered action over all moral agents and commit to a world where everyone would do as you are considering doing, then your considered action is not morally right.
In relation to our example, Kant’s own position is that your maxim will fail the universalizability test. You cannot universalize the act of lying that you are considering because you cannot logically claim that all moral agents who find themselves in the same sort of situation should likewise lie. You cannot logically claim this, Kant argues, because universal lying would render lying itself meaningless. If lying under these circumstances were a universal practice, then it would make no sense and the practice would be self-defeating. For one thing, all children in situations similar to your son’s would expect to be lied to, and would understand as false the claim, “Your mother loved you very much!” So, a lie won’t work as intended and, indeed, any parent who makes this claim truthfully will also be interpreted as lying. Kant argued that this is always the logic that issues from lying to someone or deceiving them. Universalizing lying ultimately renders communication meaningless, and so it is logically impossible to universalize actions of this kind. Lying, for Kant, is always morally wrong.
This example allows us to see one of the ways in which Kant’s Categorical Imperative tests the moral status of actions that we may consider performing; however, this isn’t the end of the story. The universalizability principle is just one formulation of the Categorical Imperative. Kant offers us three more formulations, quite different from one another but each meant as an expression of this same fundamental principle:[4]
1st formulation: Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
2nd formulation: Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.
3rd formulation: So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxim.
4th formulation: So act as if you were through your maxims a law-making member of the kingdom of ends.
The second formulation requires that, in our interactions with other persons, we never treat them as only a means to our own ends but also as “ends in themselves,” that is, as beings who possess intrinsic value. For Kant, then, is it morally wrong when we treat persons as means to our own ends, as we regularly do? No. What is morally wrong, according to Kant and his Categorical Imperative, is treating persons only as means and not, at the same time, recognizing through our interactions with them that they are also ends, that is, beings of intrinsic worth who are worthy of respect. This formulation applies to our treatment of ourselves as well as to our treatment of others.
The third formulation of the Categorical Imperative is similar to the first, but there is an important difference in focus. The first formulation focuses on the agent’s behaviour, whereas the third focuses on the agent’s will. This is significant because, according to Kant, one’s moral duty must be upheld voluntarily for one’s actions to be morally good. He thought that we must freely choose to do our duty, to do what is morally right (or wrong); otherwise, again, there is no scope for moral judgment, praise or blame. For this reason, the third formulation is sometimes referred to as the autonomy formulation. We must recognize ourselves as the authors of our dutiful actions and as determining for ourselves that the moral law is the correct law.
In the fourth formulation of the Categorical Imperative, Kant coins the phrase “kingdom of ends” to refer to the community of worldly (and perhaps other-worldly) beings who are intrinsically worthy of respect. He includes in this community any being who is rational and autonomous or, as we’ve said, who is the author of his or her own actions. His fourth formulation thus demands of us that we understand ourselves as part of a community of moral beings striving for rules or laws that are individually freely chosen but, at the same time, aimed toward our collective flourishing. When we consider acting on a particular (and then generalized) maxim, this is the greater context of which we must be mindful.
Contractarianism
Reading Assignment 3
• Chapter 1, Section III. Contractarian Ethics, pp. 35-41, of Ethics for the Professions, by John Rowan and Samuel Zinaich Jr., Print Reading File.
Contractarianism understands morality as arising out of a contract, a mutual agreement among members of society (or of some group). Moral rules and prescriptions are binding on individuals insofar as they are consistent with the fundamental principles of morality that are collectively agreed upon by members of a society. This contract or agreement is not (necessarily) an actual contract, and is usually conceived of as a hypothetical contract. If members of society were to properly deliberate about what should be the fundamental moral principles of society, what would we come up with? Contractarian moral theories aim to determine these basic principles, and claim that, by virtue of their being agreed upon, they are the legitimate moral foundations of society.
Ethical contractarianism parallels a tradition in political thought that is based on the idea of a social contract. Philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau espoused theories of government that claimed that legitimate socio-political institutions are those that are (actually or hypothetically) agreed upon by citizens who enter into a social contract with one another. Their tradition understands human persons as being primarily self-interested, and self-interest is taken to be what motivates individuals to enter into a contract with one another. The idea is that the best strategy for protecting and promoting one’s self-interest is to form an agreement with other self-interested individuals to the effect that everyone will act according to certain rules. This way, individuals may act to satisfy their own particular interests but only to the extent that they can do so without, at the same time, infringing upon the self-interested actions of others. Accordingly, in political contractarianism, government is established for the purpose of enforcing the principles agreed upon, and thus regulates social interactions. Insofar as the government does reflect the social contract, it is legitimate, and individuals are obliged to abide by it. Ethicalcontractarianism understands the legitimacy of basic moral principles and rules to issue from a similar sort of strategy.
In addition to self-interest, some contemporary ethical contractarians also acknowledge a different motivation for the social contract, namely, “a commitment to publicly justify the standards of morality to which each [citizen or member] will be held.”[5] This motivating reason is carried over from Kant’s ideas that rational beings deserve respect and that each individual member of society must autonomously come to choose the rules by which each and all should live. In this, there is overlap among Kantian deontology and some contractarian theories, the most notable of which comes to us from John Rawls who, in 1971, publishedA Theory of Justice. In this book and in numerous articles, Rawls laid out a detailed contractarian theory of the ethical foundations of distributive justice, that is, the fairest distribution of benefits and burdens within society. Our reading by Rowan and Zinaich focuses on Rawls’s work, which is understood to be a very significant contemporary contribution to ethical contractarianism.
According to Rawls, the ultimate purpose of a just society is to satisfy people’s rational desires. He thinks, moreover, that the foundations of society must reflect two moral ideals: (a) all persons are equal, from the moral point of view, and (b) persons ought to freely choose the tenets by which they are morally bound to live. Given the purpose of maximally satisfying rational desires, and given that society’s fundamental principles derive their legitimacy from their being agreed to by free and equal beings, Rawls asks how we can and should go about determining appropriate principles upon which to structure our moral lives. His first step is to provide us with a decision making mechanism – a thought experiment – that will help us identify these principles in a fair manner. We are to adopt a psychological stance that he calls “the original position,” which is meant to secure fairness in our decision by eliminating the biases that each of us has as a result of our own particular attributes and life experiences.
Rawls’s original position consists in our imagining that we do not know what particular features we have as individuals. It involves adopting what he calls a “veil of ignorance,” meaning a mindset of assuming ignorance of our own particularities. Behind the veil, we do not know who we are, and we presume that we could be any individual within society. The idea here is that, by suspending the particular perspectives that are largely influenced by our own attributes and experiences, we are able to engage in rational and unbiased argumentation with the aim of determining legitimate principles of justice. Since particularities are irrelevant, morally speaking, they must not be allowed to influence our judgments. In its demand for impartiality, Rawls encourages us to imagine that, after we rationally determine legitimate fundamental principles from within this state of assumed ignorance, we could be anyone once the veil is lifted. It is a strategy that acknowledges, yet reigns in, our self-interest in that it drives home the idea that, upon lifting the veil, we may see that we are among the worst off in society and that, as such, we would want to ensure as best we could that the principles don’t count (further) against us but, rather, count in our favour. Rawls asks us to hypothesize: under these conditions, what are the foundational moral principles to which we would agree?
One might stop at this point and ask how we could deliberate about and agree to any rules without being able to rely on our own particular perspectives. If we suspend our particular understandings of ourselves and our world, what have we left that would allow us even to engage in a contractual process? Rawls thinks, as have many other philosophers, that we can and should rely only on our rational capacities and our self-interest. When we strip away our particular characteristics, each of us remains a rational and self-interested being – and, in this, we are identical to and exchangeable with one another. In the original position, the agents who determine the fundamental principles of justice are morally equal, autonomous, rational, and self-interested – and these are the universal characteristics that will ensure the justness of our deliberations and decisions, according to Rawls. We don’t know who we are, but we do know that, whoever we are, we will want to protect and promote our own interests.
What foundational principles does Rawls think would be agreed upon by rational, self-interested beings occupying the original position? There are two:[6]
1. The Principle of Equal Liberty: Each person has an equal right to the most extensive liberties compatible with similar liberties for all.
2. The Difference Principle: Social and economic inequalities should be arranged so that they are (a) attached to offices and positions open to all members under conditions of equality of opportunity, and (b) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.
We will explain these principles briefly in order to understand some of their implications for moral action and decision making.
The Principle of Equal Liberty is straightforward. It requires that individual members of society enjoy liberties as much as is possible while only as much as is compatible with all members having similar liberties in equal measure. What is ruled out by this principle is any social arrangement that would provide some members of society with liberties that, if exercised, would negate or diminish similar liberties for other members of society.
Does this first principle ensure that there would be no inequalities among persons in society? No, and it is not meant to. It merely stipulates that all persons must be granted the freedom to act (or not) on their own accord to the extent that their actions do not preclude a similar freedom for others. What people actually do or do not do, within the confines of this general and basic constraint, is up to them. Inequalities will inevitably arise. Given the reality of inequalities, Rawls contends that, in the original position, we would come to insist upon a second fundamental principle of justice.
The Difference Principle would regulate inequalities within society. It would do so by stipulating that inequalities among persons in society are morally justified so long as they meet two conditions. First, all members of society must have an equal opportunity to access positions of privilege within society. Positions of political leadership and business leadership, for example, must be positions to which all persons can realistically aspire and must be positions that all capable persons could achieve. Professional occupations and other high paying jobs and exclusive positions must be open to all qualified persons, and the means of becoming qualified must also be accessible to all. In short, the accessibility of any position or role within society – but especially that of privileged positions – must not vary with irrelevant, discriminatory criteria. Although some persons will choose not to aspire to such positions, no one must be denied the opportunity.
The second condition that inequalities must satisfy in order to be justified is that they must be of some benefit to the least well off members of society. Any inequalities that come about as a result of the talents or efforts of some member(s) must not harm and should, in fact, benefit the least well off. Rawls reasons, here, that rational and self-interested persons in the original position would not elect to constrain individual initiative, talent, and effort, but that, at the same time, they would not accept that some individuals, even very deserving ones, should be permitted to satisfy their own interests at the expense of those in society who are the least well off. The difference principle satisfies both conditions.
What does all of this mean for professional ethics? As explained, Rawls understood his theory to pertain to the underlying moral structure of social institutions. In this, he was not directly prescribing how individuals should act or interact in any given situation, but was concerned with society as a whole and with its primary political and economic systems. We can see, though, how his theory could apply to more limited situations such as those involving professional relationships. By an extension of Rawls’s theory, the morality of relationships within professional practice is a function of the underlying agreement entered into by the participants. There are conditions that must be satisfied by any such agreement, and these are given by (adapted versions of) the two principles of justice. Beyond these fundamental conditions, the agents involved determine what is right or wrong, good or bad.
We might understand a relationship between an accountant and a client, for example, as fair and just when, first, the minimum moral conditions are met and, second, further conditions of the agreement between the client and the accountant are met. Minimally, the following conditions must obtain. First, each party in the relationship must be made no worse off by their interactions. The client’s financial records must not become less organized or less complete, and the accountant must not lose money or time by working for the client. Second, neither party is permitted to discriminate against the other. The accountant must not perform less well for a client that he happens to dislike or whose politics or religion he happens to disagree with. The client, likewise, must not discriminate against the accountant, by paying less or launching a complaint against him out of a biased motivation. But these two minimal ethical conditions do not cover all that is morally significant in this relationship. Other things that count for and against the morality of this relationship will be determined by the client and the accountant together through their agreement. Presumably, it is not enough that the client’s interests are unharmed, but they must be served, and the accountant must make money instead of just not losing any. Whatever else is agreed upon should be satisfied, and so long as it is satisfied, then the relationship and the situation are morally appropriate. The morality of the professional relationship is judged by no more and by no less than the degree to which the parties satisfy the minimally moral conditions set out by contractarianism plus whatever further conditions the parties agree to.
Virtue Ethics
Reading Assignment 4
• Chapter 1, Section IV. Virtue Ethics, pp. 41-46, of Ethics for the Professions, by John Rowan and Samuel Zinaich Jr., Print Reading File.
Theories of virtue approach morality from yet another direction. The direct focus of virtue ethics is not the actions that moral agents perform, or the rules that moral agents follow, but the character traits that moral agents possess and exhibit. The central question here is not “What should I do?” but “What sort of person should I be?” Virtue ethicists believe that persons who have the right sort of dispositions of character or, in other words, who are morally good persons will naturally do what is morally right, and that doing good is secondary to being good.
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) is the source of virtue ethics, which is sometimes called “Aristotelian ethics.” His ethics is located within a much larger corpus of philosophical works, which include metaphysics, psychology, rhetoric, physics, and politics. Overall, Aristotle sought to understand the real (as opposed to the ideal) world that we inhabit and to make sense of human nature and our place in the world in more concrete ways than had some of the popular philosophers before him. The result, in terms of his ethics, is a theory that is meant to be appropriate and “liveable” for all persons.
The main part of Aristotle’s metaphysics that influences his ethics is his idea that all things have a specific, proper function. To understand the nature of things, whether organic or not, we must understand the function that is proper to things of that kind. So, considering morality, Aristotle aims to determine what makes a person a good person by first asking about the proper function of a person. As Rowan and Zinaich explain in our primary reading for this unit, the proper function of a person, according to Aristotle, “is to strive for the good life by exercising . . . rationality in accordance with virtue.”[7] This idea is based on the observation that the rational capacities humans possess permit them to pursue a life that can be richly fulfilling. What Aristotle calls eudaimonia (“the good life”) marks the proper sort of existence for beings with our rational constitution, which is a life of happiness but, more than that, a life of human flourishing. The key to human flourishing, Aristotle contends, is to use reason to develop both intellectual and moral virtues.
Aristotle’s account of the moral virtues understands them to be dispositions of character or, in other words, character traits that dispose one to act in certain ways. To say that a person possesses the virtue of generosity is to say that he is disposed to act generously. These dispositions, he thinks, are learned through experience. We possess a natural capacity to develop moral virtues, but we must play an active role in their development if we are to come to possess them. We must apply reason to our experiences to determine how to be virtuous and to distinguish virtuous ways of being from vicious ones. As we apply ourselves in this way, and practice acting according to virtue, as reason indicates, virtuous ways of being become part of our characters. We form habits of virtue, as Aristotle says.
There is still a question about how reason allows us to distinguish morally virtuous dispositions from all other kinds, including vicious ones, so that we know the right sorts of actions to practice, the right sorts of dispositions to cultivate. Aristotle answers that the right sorts of actions are moderate (i.e., not extreme). This is his “doctrine of the mean” or “principle of moderation,” which claims that appropriate, virtuous dispositions will direct one toward moderate actions in any given situation and, by contrast, that dispositions to act in extreme ways are not appropriate. To be generous is to be disposed to give to others in the right amount and to be neither stingy nor extravagant. To be modest is to be disposed to neither shyness nor shamelessness. Knowing what is moderate, what is the right amount of action, or the appropriate level of behaviour, must be considered in the contexts of our lives. It is in this way that Aristotle thinks our natural capacities, our life experience, and our individual efforts combine so that we may come to possess the moral virtues that contribute to our flourishing.
On one level, it is easy to see how Aristotelian virtue ethics applies to professional practice. We can readily see that it’s important for professionals to exhibit Aristotelian virtues by acting in moderate rather than extreme ways. For one thing, professionals serve a diverse public, and a moderate approach is more likely to serve a wider spectrum of needs and personalities adequately than an extreme approach. Another thing is that many of the matters that cause people to seek professional assistance are sensitive ones, and virtues such as generosity, liberality, friendliness, and patience can offset a client’s vulnerability. Finally, it is commonsensical that acting in accordance with virtue facilitates good relationships between persons generally, and this is no less true for the relationships that professionals develop with their clients, society, their colleagues, their superiors, and so on.
On another level, however, it is not clear how virtue ethics informs decision making within professional practice, since it fails to specify any decision making strategy or a test for right and wrong action. Indirectly it may help with decision making and action, but that is not its primary purpose.
Applying Normative Theories to a Moral Situation
Here, we will consider a descriptive case and how the five theories we have studied (six if you count the two variations of utilitarianism) may be applied to that case. We will proceed in an explanatory manner but will not fully develop a moral analysis based on these theories or show in detail how they could and should be applied to this particular case. This means that the application of the theories below is not meant to be agood example of how to go about fulfilling your first PHIL 333 assignment; rather, it is meant to be aninformative example – or, better, an informative sample – of the reasoning that could issue from these theories when they are ”called to action.” Put another way, the application below does not represent precisely what you should do for your first assignment (An Application of the Normative Ethical Theories) but is a model of how these theories can be applied.
Quinn on Manipulation
Reading Assignment 6
• “Accepting Manipulation or Manipulating What’s Acceptable?” by Aaron Quinn, pp. 280-288 in your textbook.
In his article about the ethics of photomanipulation, Aaron Quinn employs the theories of utilitarianism, deontology, and virtue in the development of his arguments. He discusses certain virtues that are central to journalism ethics, how Kant’s categorical imperative can usefully inform journalists’s decisions about reporting the news accurately and truthfully, and how utilitarian considerations can help clarify the goals toward which journalists should aim.
Quinn draws our attention to the idea that the ethical principle “represent the truth” is not as straightforward as it might seem at first. Yes, we might say, of course it is more complicated than it sounds. We know this from our everyday experiences of trying to accurately express our thoughts and our perceptions to others, whether in words, gestures, or images. Often, however, our contextual, interpersonal understandings allow us to glean from one another sufficiently accurate truths. Journalists don’t benefit from having these same sorts of contextual cues, since they do not directly communicate with individual clients. What they write and how they represent an image must include in itself a degree of accuracy that satisfies their obligations to tell the truth.
Quinn examines the journalistic practice of adjusting an image to best depict the reality witnessed versus adjusting the image to alter that reality. The latter gives rise not only to questions of accurate representation and truth, but to questions about sincerity, integrity, and trust. A well-intentioned, sincere journalist will sometimes struggle with determining the point at which manipulation betrays reality. Less scrupulous journalists, however, may approach this problem from the other end and manipulate in order to alter reality, perhaps with the aim of attracting more readers or viewers and make more sales. Quinn, with the help of some of the moral theories studied in this unit, takes on the task of sorting out some of the ways that journalists may recognize the fine line between right and wrong and then act in accordance with what is morally right.
Pellegrino’s Virtuous Physician
Reading Assignment 7
• “The Virtuous Physician and the Ethics of Medicine,” by Edmund D. Pellegrino, pp. 449-453 in your textbook.
Edmund D. Pellegrino supports the importance of a virtue-based ethics in medical practice. He argues that, although it is necessary for physicians to act in accordance with various rights and duties encompassed by medicine insofar as these are given by deontological and/or contractarian reasoning, this is not sufficient. By means of duty-based reasoning, physicians may determine the moral rights held by patients, by themselves, and by others with whom they interact, and they may clarify the obligations they have in relation to patients, families, themselves, the institutions they work for, the public, and so on. Rights and duties are important aspects of medical ethics, and it is important that medical codes of ethics give expression to these regulating values. However, rights and duties, Pellegrino argues, constitute only part of medical ethics, properly understood, and cannot, for example, account for the differences between the physician who approaches his practice primarily from a self-interested perspective and the physician who approaches his practice from an altruistic perspective.
According to Pellegrino, not only is altruism a necessary component of proper medical practice, but “some degree of supererogation is built into the nature of the relationship of those who are ill and those who profess to help them.”[9] Not only should physicians be motivated to serve the interests and well-being of patients, but they should be ready and willing to perform beyond the call of duty, at a higher moral level than would normally be expected of persons in society, and they should be ready and willing to do so even if this means a sacrifice of their self-interest to some degree. A higher level of moral commitment is an integral part of the nature of medicine. Moreover, this supererogatory component of medicine’s nature, Pellegrino contends, is especially important to emphasize “in the current climate of commercialization of the healing relationship” (452).
In Pellegrino’s view, self-interested and altruistic physicians alike can honour specific rights of patients and fulfill their specific professional duties, because the satisfaction of rights and duties does not account for the differences in commitment that physicians may exhibit. He thinks that this supports the contention that medical ethics and medical responsibility must be informed by a virtue-based ethics, as well as by legalistic and deontological or contractarian approaches to morality.
As far as medical codes of ethics go, Pellegrino says, there is and should be “a three-tiered system of obligations related to the special roles of physicians in society” (450). On the most straightforward level are legalistic requirements, which specify physicians’s minimum obligations insofar as these are stipulated by laws and formal rulings. Beyond these are obligations that issue from deontological or contractarian moral reasoning, specifying rights and duties that physicians are obliged to uphold, not legally, but as a matter of professional responsibility. Finally, there are obligations that stem from virtue-based considerations, which specify morally superior ways in which physicians should carry out their legal and duty-based obligations, as well as how physicians may perform beyond these first two levels and demonstrate appropriate compassion, conscientiousness, fidelity, and so on. Each level of morality indicates a different level of “ethical sensitivity,” (450) where the most sensitive dimensions of medical practice can be explained only by reference to moral virtue.
In accordance with Aristotle’s account of moral virtue, Pellegrino claims that “Medicine is itself ultimately an exercise of practical wisdom – a right way of acting in difficult and uncertain circumstances for a specific end, i.e., the good of a particular person who is ill” (451). Pellegrino contends that “the good of the patient cannot be fully protected by rights and duties alone,” (450) and that “The more we yearn for ethical sensitivity. . . the more we lean on the character traits of the moral agent.”[10] A responsible physician is a virtuous physician, and the virtues according to which a physician acts are part and parcel with her being, first, a good person.
The question about whether professional responsibility, in any given field, can be fully accounted for by appeal to the professional duties specified within professional codes of ethics recurs in this course. Some theorists contend that acting according to virtuous dispositions in the course of one’s professional practice is a matter of moving beyond the rules espoused by professional codes, but other theorists argue that virtues that enhance professional performance are themselves built into formalized codes of ethics
Conclusion
Unit 2 is the second of three units dealing with the foundational elements needed for a good understanding of issues in professional ethics. Five main ethical theories were presented and explored. Although this list is not exhaustive, it is comprehensive in terms of the ethical theories that philosophers historically and currently focus on. It is important to emphasize that these theories are not presented as beyond critique but, rather, as theories that provide important insights into ethical situations and moral reasoning even though they may be problematic in one way or another. By recognizing and engaging in both positive and negative evaluation, the foundation for fair and reasonable argumentation that is the basis for good philosophical reasoning becomes established. In addition, this unit provided opportunities to apply these theories to morally problematic situations.
In the third and final unit in the first part of the course, you will examine the concept of a “profession” and determine which characteristics most reasonably distinguish some occupations as professions from others that we are less likely to consider to be professions. As you will see, the answer to the question “What is a profession?” is not a simple matter; there is debate and controversy over the occupations that should and should not be included. Any satisfactory resolution to this debate will require an examination of the reasonableness of arguments and their justificatory power in drawing the line in one place as opposed to another. Unit 3 explores two additional considerations: whether following a code of ethics is sufficient for professional conduct to be ethical conduct and whether professional ethics is distinct from ordinary morality.