combat contracts

Explain the combat contracts and apply to US military behavior in WWII (sources: lecture, Kindvatter)

August 17 lecture note

I. The Paradox of Domestic Commitment
A. Domestic Commitment – The Level of Average Domestic Compliance with the Economic Demands (Costs of Warfare)
1. Minimum Commitment Level – the minimum a population Will pay for war
a. The Greater the Minimum, the Greater the Level of Commitment
B. The Paradox – We would predict domestic commitment would decline as the costs of warfare have increased, but the opposite seems to be the case.
1. Domestic Population in General are More Rather than Less Likely to Support the costs of War.

III. Illustrations
A. Cost of Commitment
1. Direct Costs (taxation; Debt; Conscription; Economic Opportunity Costs).
2. Damage – Damage has Increased to Large-Scale Spillovers to Civilian Populations (Blockades; Bombing)
3. Duration – Preparation for War and Length of Wars Have Increased (1914-1945)
B. Domestic Commitment and Anti-War Opposition
1. The Growth of Peace Movements and Debate About Specific Wars have Not Reduced Commitment Levels
2. The Expectation of Peace and the Fact of War

*Domestic Commitment and Total War – The U.S. 1941-1945
A. Strategic Goals (Strategy)
1. Fight – Two Front War and Win (Germany, Japan)
2. Supply allies with military and economic resources
3. Invest In Post-War Peace
B. Domestic Commitment
1. 8 million in mIlitary Service
2. 20 million in war production
3. Rationing and Mobilization of Civilian Industry for War
4. Debt Finance and War taxation
5. Accepting Casualties (400,000 dead)
6. Science and War (Atomic Weapon)

**Domestic Commitment and Total War – U.S.S.R. 1941-1945
A. Strategic Goals
1. Survival
2. Defeat of Germany
3. Expansion of Soviet Power
B. Domestic Commitment
1. 30 million in military (800,000 women)
2. Rationing, Hihg Opportunity Costs for Civilians – 40 million in the War industry
3. Resistance to Occupation (1 million Partisans)
4. Enduring Defeat and High Casualties (20 to 30 million dead, 12-13 million in military service)
5. Cost
a. One-third of country destroyed or damaged.
b. 20-30 million dead
c. Loss of 10 years of economic growth (G.D.P.)

***China and Total War 1937-45 (Sino-Japanese War)
A. Strategic Goals
1. Survival and Stalemate (win by attrition)
B. Domestic Commitment
1. 20 million dead
2. Repeated defeats
3. 12 million in military
4. Price and Monetary Inflation – Requisitioning (of food, fuel, conscription)
5. Accepting Casualties – 3 million combatant dead (certain)

*American Combat Fatalities
A. Civil War – 600,000
1. 1864 Grant’s Overland Campaign – 60,000 casualties in six weeks (Battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor)
B. W.I.I. – 40,000+/-
C. W.W.II. – 400,000
D. Korea (1950-53) – 50,000
E. Vietnam 1965-1971 – 60,000
F. Gulf Wars and Afghanistan – 2000+
G. WW.II. Economic Mobilization and the War Economy (Rationing, Conscription)

IV. The Origins of the Necessity of Broad and Deep Domestic Commitment
A. The Logistics Constraint – The Necessity of Logistics – the Production and Distribution of the Means of Warfare
B. The Modern Logistics Chain (Any significant Break in the Chain Can Cause Military Failure)
1. Taxation
2. Debate Mobilization
3. Recruitment
a. Conscription
b. Volunteering
4. Production (of weapons, food, fuel, transport, aircraft, ships, etc.)
5. Distribution
6. Recuperation
7. The Problem of Resistance

*Two Facts – Model – Fighters and Producers
V. The Logistics Constraint – Two Strategies of Resolution
A. The Strategy of Self-Supply
*1. Fighters are Producers
2. Logistics are Embedded in Local Institutions (Families, Villages, Cities)
3. Illustrations
a. Greeks and Romans (Armor and Weapons in the Home)
b. Aztecs – the Tortilla
c. Central Asian House Archers (1000 B.C. – 1300 A.D. – Horse, Bow, Archer)
B. Strategy of Specialization
1. Division of Labor Between Fighters and Producers
2. Logistics and Specialized and Militaries are Institutionally Distinct
3. Illustration – Mass Militaries 1866-2000.

VI. Explanatory Hypotheses
A. Coercion – Rulers Mobilize Resources Through the Threat and Use of Physical Coercion
B. Nationalism – Rulers mobilize resources through the manipulation of Nationalism
C. Bargaining- Rulers Mobilize Resources by Expanding the Benefits Produced by Rulers through Bargaining with Key Interests (Labor, Farmers, Capital, Middle Classes, etc.)
1. Asset Binding – Rulers Bind the Interests of the Ruled to the Survival of the State
2. Citizenship Values

*The Four Transitions and Modern Warfare 1500-2000’s
A. Each transition references a:
1. Stable style of war-fighting
2. Core military technology
3. Dynamics (causes of change)
B. Style of war-fighting
1. How weapons and combatants are used to maximum advantage
a. Efficiency (most for the least)
C. Core military technology
1. Weapons
2. Institutions
3. Combatants
4. The Technology is the ‘winning’ combination of these factors
a. Example – mechanized warfare (1930s-2000s) – winning combination of infantry, tanks, artillery, aircraft
D. Causes of Change
1. Incremental

**The Gunpowder Dilemma (for European Rulers 1500-1660)
A. Incremental vs. Discontinuous Change: early Gunpowder weapons constitute discontinuous change
B. Gunpowder technology makes possible specialized fighters (combatants) who can mass firepower (projectile weapons) – can defeat previous types of warfare.
C. The Gunpowder Dilemma: Invest or Do Not Invest in Permanent Gunpowder Militaries
1. Invest – Maximizes Security but can Maximize Domestic Resistance (to costs of commitment)
2. Do not Invest – Minimizes Resistance and Minimizes security
3. Rational Choice: Invest
4. The European Security Dilemma
D. Core Military Technology
1. Gunpowder weapons (land and sea)
2. Permanent Specialized Military Institutions
a. State Militaries (standing armies)
3. Dynamics – Incremental Development of Gunpowder Based Weapons and Overall Technologies
4. Illustration the socket Bayonet (1704)
a. Infantry Warfare (1500-1770+)
1. Matchlocks’ pikes; swords; cavalry; cannon
2. Bayonet replaces the pike and provides simultaneous firepower and protection from horses.
3. Flintlock replaces matchlock

I. The First Transition – 1500-1660 – From Gunpowder Dilemmas to Linear Warfare
A. Style of War-Fighting – Concentration of Gunpowder Militaries for Sieges and Decisive Battles (land and Sea)
B. Core Military Technology
1. Land warfare – gunpowder infantry (and cavalry) organized in permanent, specialized military institution
a. State (national) militaries
b. Necessitates permanent war taxation and elastic recruitment.
c. The failure of noble and mercenary warfare alternatives
d. The failure of making the enemy pay
C. Dynamics – Incremental Change
*Sieges (of cities, forts)

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[COMPLETE]
II. The Second Transition – From Linear Warfare to Mass Warfare
A. Style of Warfare
1. Land warfare – column and line
2. Naval warfare – line ahead
B. Core military technology
1. Permanent state militaries
2. Aristocratic Officers Corps
3. Long-Service Professionals (land and sea)
a. Recruitment – mix of volunteering and conscription
4. Armies- escalation of scale: from 20,000 to 200,000+ armies
5. Purpose-build warships (fellas of 60-100)
6. 1-6 significantly escalated the need for taxes and debt.
C. Dynamics- Reinvention of the Citizen Soldier

Modern Mechanized Warfare
A. Defense in Depth
B. Attack on Narrow Fronts
C. Attackers Goal – Divide, Destroy, Encircle Enemy
1. France 1940 – “Operation Sickle Cut” British-French Main Force in Belgium. German Main Armored Attack Through Ardennes Forest Encircles Enemy Main Force

8/19 lecture note

I. Domestic Mobilization and Domestic Commitment — the Coercion Hypothesis
A. The Model: Pure Coercion (commitment forced through state violence)
B. Limitations
• The paradox of perfect tyranny (1+1>1)
• Perfect tyrant rules solely through coercion — no benefits produced
• But in order to function the perfect tyrant must gain commitment among larger numbers of hte population (ruler coalition must be larger)
C. However, ruling coalitoin must be held together by tangible benefits, thus making the perfect tyrant imperfect
D. The myth of invincibility
• Power never challenged can hve zero reputation
• But power challenged is not invincible
• High cost strategy: it is very costly to create a coercive reputation
E. The fact of resistance
• Requisitioning, locating and local resistance (1660-1945)
F. Demand for coercion- Overcoming free riding problems
G. Highly coercive regimes are fragile
II. Domestic commitmetn and the mobilization of nationalism
A. Nation: a political collectivity of shared historical sentiment and experience
B. Nationalism-Affirmative believe in national autonomy
C. Is nationalism war like? Types of nationalism
• Constitutional (US/France)
• Ethnic (Germany/Japan)
• Radical
D. Nationalism is “neutral” — can facilitate or impede domestic commitment and war
E. State protection of the nation fits best in the bargaining hypothesis
III. The second transition- from linear warfare to mass warfare
A. Style of warfare
• Land warfare (column and line)
• Naval warfare
B. Core military technology
• Permanent state militaries
• Aristocratic officer corps
• Long service professionals (land and sea) — recruitment is a mix of volunteering and conscription
• Armies: escalation of scale from 20,000 to 200,000 armies
• Purpose- built warships (fleets from 60-100)
• 1-6 significantly escalate the need for taxes and debt
C. Dynamics: re-invention of the citizen soldier
IV. The third transition: From mass warfare to capital intensive (industrial) warfare (1776-1945)
A. Style of war fighting
• Mass militaries (2 million+ armies, 100+ ship navies) for decisive battles and campaigns
• American (1775-83) and French (1789-1800) Revolution prove citizen-soldier can fight and win linear war — makes feasible 1+ million armie raised primarily through conscription
• Escalation of costs of commitment
B. Core military technology
• Mechanized armies
• Oceanic navies
• Air forces
C. Dynamic: industrial warfare esclaates costs and risks of commitment
V. Fourth transition: From capital to knowledge intensive warfare
A. Style of war fighting
• Mix of mass militaries, special/elite forces, and application of science and engineering to warfare (drones)
B. Core military technology
• The citizen professional
• High skill; highly competitive military personnel
• Constantly changing weapons and tactics
• The necessity of the rifle soldier
C. Dynamics: indterinate (hard to predict