In the Bertrand model of this section, show that if c1 = c2 = c, then ( p∗ 1 , p∗ 2 ) = (c,c) is a Nash equilibrium but each firm makes zero profit

In the Bertrand model of this section, show that if c1 = c2 = c, then ( p∗ 1 , p∗ 2 ) = (c,c) is a Nash equilibrium but each firm makes zero profit

In the Bertrand model of this section, show that if c1 = c2 = c, then ( p∗ 1 , p∗ 2 ) = (c,c) is a Nash equilibrium but each firm makes zero profit

In the Bertrand model of this section, show that if c1 = c2 = c, then ( p∗ 1 , p∗ 2 ) = (c,c) is a Nash equilibrium but each firm makes zero profit