learning to play in the new “share economy

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SIP80005 Assessment Task Two – Case Study Analysis Page 1 of 3
Swinburne University of Technology
SIP80005 Leadership and Relationship Management
Semester 2 2014

Assessment Title: Case Study Analysis

Introduction
 This assessment task asks you to identify and critically analyse factors that influence the
leadership decision making processes in the assigned case study
 It requires you to utilise theories that you have been introduced to throughout the
‘Leadership and Relationship Management’ unit to present an informed opinion on the
effectiveness (or otherwise) of the ways in in which leadership was demonstrated
 It asks you to develop and present some alternative leadership pathways to those in the
case study, with constructive reference to the unit’s core concepts, theories and readings.
Unit learning outcomes
Learning Outcome 2: Demonstrate real-time awareness of the interpersonal dynamics involving
themselves and others.
Learning Outcome 3: Develop deep understanding of the unconscious as well as conscious
projections which influence and often distort the dynamics of and management of relationships.
Learning Outcome 4: Develop a model of leadership appropriate to their skills and employ this
within their organisational context.
Pedagogy or Learning Approach
Case studies and scenarios are commonly used methods of problem-based learning. Typically, these
methods are used to develop student reasoning, problem-solving and decision-making skills.

SIP80005 Assessment Task Two – Case Study Analysis Page 2 of 3

Assessment Task Guidelines
Referencing
Please re-read the section on referencing in the Unit Outline. You must use the Harvard referencing
style throughout your assessment and include an accurate reference list at the end of the
assessment.
Helpful information on referencing can be found at
http://www.swinburne.edu.au/lib/studyhelp/harvard-quick-guide.pdf
Submission Requirements

 Assessments must be submitted via the Blackboard unit site through the ‘Assessments’
facility. This assessment will be submitted through the tool Turnitin.
 Do not email the assessment to the convenor.
 Keep a backup of your submission. If your assessment goes astray, whether your fault or
ours, you will be required to reproduce it.
 The assessment should be in one single Microsoft Word document and should be written in
12 point font size and should use 1.15 line spacing between each line.
 Pages of the assessment should have footers which include your name, student ID, unit
code, assessment title and page numbers.
 It is expected that all work submitted, will have been edited for spelling, grammar and
clarity.
 The word count does not include references or appendices.
 An Assessment Cover Sheet must be submitted with your assignment. The standard
Assessment Cover Sheet is available from the Current Students web site.
 The Assessment Cover Sheet should be submitted to Turnitin with the assignment.
Extensions and Late Submission
Late Submissions – Unless an extension has been approved, you cannot submit an assessment after
the due date. If this does occur, you will be penalised 10% of the assessments worth for each
calendar day the task is late up to a maximum of 5 days. After 5 days a zero result will be recorded.

SIP80005 Assessment Task Two – Case Study Analysis Page 3 of 3
Marking Criteria
The following global rubric for an assessment gives your grade descriptions.
Grades Depth and Breadth of
Task Coverage
Critical Analysis required by
Task
Structure, Language and
Conventions
High
Distinction
80 – 100%
All of the task was
addressed and
appropriately researched
in great depth
Great depth of analysis,
evaluation and interpretation
Evidence of deep and broad
understanding
All components conform
to high academic /
professional standards
Distinction
70 – 79%
Most of the task was
addressed and
appropriately researched
in great depth
Evidence of analysis,
evaluation and interpretation
Most components
conform to high
academic / professional
standards
Credit
60 – 69%
Most of the task was
addressed and mostly
researched appropriately
Some evidence of elementary
analysis and evaluation
Most components
conform to acceptable
academic / professional
standards
Pass
50 – 59 %
Basic components of the
task were addressed and
mostly researched
appropriately
Descriptive and/or summary
Key concepts understood
Basic structure
Expressed in own words
Fail
< 50%
Superficial and/or
inadequate addressing of
task
Limited / poor understanding
of key concepts
Poor structure and/or
lack of clarity and /or
using the words of
others
Adapted from Vardi (2012 p. 29) Effective feedback for student learning in higher education.
Milperra, NSW: Higher Education Research and Development Society of Australasia.

Assessment Help
If you have any queries or concerns you may discuss them with the convenor by phone, email or
during scheduled student consultation times.
Technical Help
Technical assistance can be obtained from the Swinburne Service Desk: servicedesk@swin.edu.au or
(03) 9214 5000.

IllustratIon: antony Hare
Case Study
H
enry Beyer walked up to a Mini Coo -per in the city parking lot across the
street from his office in downtown
Houston. He waved his brand-new Village -Car card near the door handle and got in.
“It looks like someone left something
behind,” his colleague Tony Cummins said,
reaching into the back and picking up a pair
of socks. He laughed; Henry grimaced.
The two were executives at Beacon Car
Rental, one of the industry’s most estab -lished and respected firms. Henry was the
senior vice president of operations. Tony,
the chief marketing officer, had suggested
taking a drive so that they could talk about
Beacon’s latest acquisition—VillageCar. He
knew that Henry would be making the
call on how to integrate the car-sharing
company, and he wanted to bend Henry’s
ear about it.
“Have you ever been in one of these
things? I thought we weren’t going to fit,”
Henry said, looking around the inside of
the Mini. Both men were more than six
feet tall.
Tony admitted that the car was a
strange place to meet. “But I wanted to
talk with you,” he explained. For the past
five years, Henry had led the integration
of all Beacon’s acquisitions, and he had
the process down to a science. Bloomberg
Businessweek had featured the firm in an
article about companies that take speedy
approaches to M&A while remaining sensi -tive to the human costs.
“This one is going to take a little more
time than usual,” Henry said, “but I as-sured Mark this morning that we’d get it
done, like we always have.” Mark Lewis
was the CEO.
“Still, I don’t want us to lose sight of
what a game changer this acquisition is,”
Tony said. Henry rolled his eyes.
“Let’s not overstate it,” he replied.
They’d been having the same conversation
for months.
“It can’t be overstated,” Tony said.
“Think about it: We’re not in a rental car,
we’re in a shared c a r .”
“Rental, shared. Same difference.”
Learning to
Play in the
New “Share
Economy”
Can an auto rental company fully integrate its
car-sharing start-up without losing customers?
by Susan Fournier, Giana M. Eckhardt, and
Fleura Bardhi
The Experts
Marc McCabe, product and
business development lead, airbnb
Andre Haddad, C eo of relay rides
HBr’s fictionalized case studies present
dilemmas faced by leaders in real
companies and offer solutions from experts. this
one is based on the case study “ acquiring Zipcar:
Brand Building in the share economy,” by susan
Fournier, Giana eckhardt, and Fleura Bardhi
(Boston university school of Management, 2012).
Susan Fournier is a professor of marketing at Boston university. Giana M.
Eckhardt is a professor of marketing at royal Holloway, university of london.
Fleura Bardhi is a professor of marketing at City university london.
July–August 2013 Harvard Business review 125
HBr.or G EXPERIENCE
As they turned onto Fannin Street,
just a few blocks from their office, Tony
pointed out another VillageCar, and then
another. Instead of sitting in rental car
lots, they were parked in dedicated spots
in public areas, for easy access. One was
a Prius, the other a Nissan pickup truck.
“We’ll be able to tap into a big demographic
that dreads being seen in a Ford Taurus
from Beacon—or in anything from Bea -con,” he said. “These are people who get
dewy-eyed about sharing. When they get
a Village Car, they’re making a statement
that they want to access things, not buy
them. It’s anticonsumerist, pro-environ-ment, pro-community—everything Gen Y
loves.”
“I know I’m an ops guy and you’re the
marketing guru, but I don’t buy it,” Henry
said. “The experience just doesn’t feel spe-cial to me. The guy before us didn’t fill the
gas tank, and he barely showed up on time.
He didn’t even wave as he ran off. What’s
so pro-community about that? Apart from
the empty gas tank and the socks, this
seems exactly like a rental. Why should
the VillageCar deal be any different from
Starr?” The year before, Beacon had ac-quired a smaller rental car chain that had
hundreds of locations in the Southwest.
Tony shook his head. “You know I
think we mishandled Starr. It was clear the
brand had cachet in the region, which we
could have leveraged. But we ended up in -tegrating it to death. If we treat VillageCar
the same way, we’re going to lose all the
potential benefits and miss out on a huge
opportunity.”
“We’ve gone over this already,” Henry
said. “The goal should be to use our scale,
capabilities, resources—everything we’ve
got—to make VillageCar more profitable.
It’s going to benefit from our fleet-
purchasing power. And its in-town park-ing spaces will help us build our presence
in urban areas. Not to mention, it will give
us access to a younger customer base.”
“But this is our opportunity to get in
on a trend,” Tony said, rapping gently on
the dashboard. “More and more people
are opting out of owning; they’re willing
to pay to temporarily access something.
It’s not just car sharing. It’s music sharing,
bike sharing, apartment sharing, designer
clothing sharing, dog sharing. Even dogs,
Henry! That Forbes cover story estimated
that the share economy will be a $3.5 bil-lion category this year. I’ve said it before,
and I’ll say it again: The best path forward
is to keep VillageCar separate—the opera -tions, the branding, everything.”
“Come on—we both know the costs of
that,” Henry said. “Mark would balk at
the inefficiencies.” The CEO was known
for running a tight ship. “And we haven’t
seen any evidence that VillageCar’s model
is a radical departure from ours or that its
customers behave differently. Sure, there
are things about the model we should
adopt—hourly rentals, more-convenient
locations. Fine. But when it comes to cars,
‘sharing’ is just a fancy word for ‘rental.’
The only thing customers are sharing is
the crap they leave in the backseat.”
A Third Opinion
Later that afternoon Annabel Howard,
Beacon’s CFO and Henry’s boss, leaned
back in her chair. “I’m hardly ever the
tiebreaker,” she said.
“We don’t want you to settle anything.
We just need another opinion,” Henry told
her. He and Tony replayed their debate.
“What’s the big deal? Clearly a full inte-gration is the most cost-effective approach.
We’ll get rid of the overlaps, maximize the
synergies, and be done with it,” Annabel
said. “I have no interest in creating an
unwieldy bureaucracy. Managing multiple
brands, running separate IT systems, set-ting different price structures—it would be
a mess.”
Henry smiled at Tony, gloating a little.
“But this is different,” Tony countered.
“VillageCar isn’t like Starr or any of the
others. Starr was a straight-up rental car
company, same business model as ours. It
gave us access to a new geographic market.
I thought there was some marketing
benefit to retaining the brand, but you
all disagreed, and I lived with it. This is a
much bigger opportunity.”
He leaned across the desk. “Think
about it from a risk management perspec -tive, Annabel. This may be just what we
need.” Their industry was struggling. The
basic business model hadn’t changed in
30 years, and Beacon, like all the other
major players, was forced to compete
more and more on price. Annabel had
been saying that this was a big risk and
was turning car rentals into a commodity,
with no way to win.
“Hmm—I hadn’t quite thought about it
that way,” she said.
Now that he had her attention, Tony
kept going: “Maybe we need to go out with
VillageCar in front. We don’t want to miss
the boat, like Kodak did with digital pho-tography. Maybe it’s time to shake things
up.” He told her he’d been at the Village -Car headquarters the previous week with
Mark. “The energy there is great. We need
some of that: the start-up feeling that
anything’s possible, that we can change
the world. I worry that if we gobble the
company up and treat it like a business
unit, we won’t innovate on our existing
model, and we’ll be left behind.”
The three of them were silent for a mo-ment. Then Henry spoke: “We’d be adding
costs instead of taking them out.”
“That’s true,” Annabel said. “But maybe
the costs of not changing our model would
be even bigger.”
Consumer Research
A week later Henry hurried down the hall
to Tony’s office. He knocked but then
quickly opened the door without waiting
for a response.
Tony swung around in his chair.
“What’s the emergency?”
“Remember what I said about sharing
being hype?” He set a paper down on
Tony’s desk; it was an article from the
Journal of Consumer Research.
Tony stared at the title and abstract,
trying to decipher the academic language.
“Bottom line,” Henry said, “this is
a study of car-sharing customers. Out
of all the things they value about their
experience, the biggest one is access. The
EXPERIENCE
126 Harvard Business Review July–August 2013
environment and community aren’t even
on their radar. They care about afford -ability and convenience, just like Beacon’s
customers do. Functionality is all that
matters.”
Tony up picked the paper, stared again
at the abstract, and shrugged.
“Take my word for it,” Henry said
impatiently. “I’ve been studying this for
the past hour. And it’s pretty clear: We
need a clean, straightforward integration,
like I said. We get VillageCar’s customers,
we can adopt its shorter-rental model, we
take over its locations, but ultimately we
give those customers what they want:
good prices and convenience. And no
socks in the backseat.”
“And the name? We’re going to kill
‘VillageCar’?” Tony asked. “No one over
there is going to like that. They agreed to
the acquisition assuming we’d keep their
brand intact.”
“But we didn’t make any promises. I say
no separate brands.” Henry argued that
two brands would be too complicated for
customers; they wouldn’t know which
company they were dealing with.
“That’s not necessarily true,” Tony said.
“Look at Toyota and Lexus: two different
brands, two entirely separate consumer
groups. Yet everyone knows they’re the
same company. Besides, if we merge
the brands, we alienate the VillageCar
customer base. It’s growing every day,
and we don’t want to lose those people.
Their loyalty is fanatical. They don’t call
themselves ‘villagers’ for nothing. They’ll
revolt, and VillageCar’s employees might
join them. ”
“‘Villagers’—hah,” Henry said. “Maybe
that’s what VillageCar’s marketers call
them, but I doubt customers call them -selves that. This study shows that the
emotional connection is a sham. Village-Car’s not about community. It’s about find-ing the most convenient, economical way
of getting from point A to point B.”
“If that’s true, why are our customer
bases so different?” Tony asked. “Why
is everyone in the world talking about
the share economy? Why is that market
ballooning?”
“Nice Wheels”
Henry had already ordered by the time
his son Kyle showed up at Jasper’s
restaurant.
“Sorry I’m late,” Kyle said. “My market-ing professor wouldn’t stop talking.” Kyle
was studying business at the University of
Houston. He and Henry tried to meet for
lunch once a week. This was their favorite
spot, because it had outside tables and
amazing burgers.
Henry asked Kyle if he was liking the
class. “Yeah, it’s interesting stuff—how to
make people want things they shouldn’t,”
Kyle replied.
Henry laughed. “Is that what you’re
taking away from it?”
“More or less. Hey, can I get a ride back
to campus after this?” Kyle asked.
“Sure—if you’re OK going in that,”
Henry said, pointing to the Audi A3 parked
on the street in front of them.
“Nice wheels,” his son said. “Did Mom
really let you buy that?”
“No way. I’m renting it. Or accessing it—
I’m not sure what to call it. It’s from this
company we just acquired,” Henry said.
“You told me about that last time.
Village Car, right? I’ve seen a few of those
on campus.”
Henry explained that he was on the
hook to decide about the integration. “Ev -eryone’s talking about how your genera -tion is different, how sharing is the wave
of the future. But it seems like just a fad
to me.”
“Well, I’m not sure how to integrate
companies. But I do know something
about my generation, and we’re definitely
not like you,” Kyle said. Henry rolled his
eyes at the familiar refrain. “I’m not being
a pain, Dad. I’m trying to help. Listen,
I’m not into buying things. I just want to
use them when I need them. I remember
you told me how proud you were when
you and Mom bought your first car—that
Nissan—right after you got married. You
remember everything about it—the smell,
the salesman’s name, where you drove
first. But I don’t really care about stuff like
that. I don’t want to own lots of things.
You’ve got a wall of CDs; I have this,” he
said, holding up his iPhone.
Henry listened intently. Kyle had a
point. If Beacon took its typical approach,
it risked losing a whole generation of con -sumers like Kyle.
“Owning weighs you down,” Kyle
continued. “Forces you to commit. Look,
today you have an Audi. Tomorrow you
can have a van and go to Home Depot. You
can try different things out. Not owning is
liberating.”
Henry watched his son take a bite of his
burger. He was amazed that his kid—he
still thought of him as a little boy—was
starting to sway him.
“It’s a marketer’s dream, isn’t it?” Henry
said grudgingly. “Telling customers that
your product lets them change their
identity by the hour.” It was an appealing
prospect when he looked at it from this
angle. Going out to customers with a mes -sage like that could transform the prob -lems that had been plaguing rentals for
years. But he knew his decision couldn’t
be all about marketing. He had to consider
efficiencies, too.
“So help me sound smart in my market -ing class,” Kyle said. “What are you going
to tell the CEO?”
Q
What should Henry
recommend for
the VillageCar
integration?
See commentaries on the next page.
HBR.ORG
Tell us what you’d do.
Go to hbr.org .
“If we just gobble the
new company up, we
won’t innovate on our
existing model.”
Hbr.orG
July–August 2013 Harvard business review 127
Henry sHould listen to Tony: VillageCar
should remain as independent from Beacon
as possible. The two companies have very
different business models. A rental is some -thing you use for several days when you go
on a business trip or a vacation. A shared
car is something you use for a short time
to run errands, move a piano, or impress
a date. VillageCar’s customers don’t want
what Beacon offers. They want flexible ac -cess to a car on a regular basis.
Henry is right that VillageCar’s custom -ers care about convenience, but they also
believe in community. Those aren’t mutually
exclusive ideals; in fact, they’re intercon -nected. In the sharing economy, community
is a bond around a common ideal. In the
case of VillageCar, that might be conve-nience and affordability, or the ability to
change up your car when you want to.
At Airbnb we help our customers bond
around common ideals: being able to stay
anywhere, to meet other people, to have
an adventure. The focus of our marketing
is on fostering the community that makes
sharing possible. We motivate our users
by giving them opportunities to connect
with people who have similar values and
interests. That’s how we ensure that the
listings on our site are treated with the
same respect people would show to a fam-ily member’s home. It’s how you ensure that
fewer socks are left behind.
Henry’s concerns that the sharing
economy is a fad are unfounded. There
are myriad reasons why businesses based
on sharing have come about now. First,
advances in technology play a major role:
Five or six years ago, people didn’t have the
tools, and consequently the confidence,
to conduct these types of transactions.
Second, the economic downturn has forced
people to think about what they own and
what they need—and to question whether
they need to own things in the way they
previously have. Media is a good example.
Ten or 12 years ago, you had to break the
law to access music through the internet.
But now that you can legally access any
song with a couple of clicks, what’s the
point of owning a CD? Specific trends like
that one may continue to evolve, but the
sharing economy is here to stay.
Tony says that VillageCar’s employees
will revolt if Beacon subsumes the brand,
and I think he’s right. Chances are, the
cultures of the two businesses are dramati-cally different. Those of us who work in a
sharing business want an environment
where the pace is fast, the atmosphere is
fun, and decisions are made quickly. We
see ourselves as pioneers in an emerging
field. If Henry wants to make full use of
what VillageCar has to offer, he needs to be
mindful of why its employees come to work
every day and what makes them happy.
Successful acquisitions can take many
different shapes. But when the acquired
company is a potential disrupter, I see a
trend toward allowing independence. Think
of Google and YouTube, or Facebook and
Instagram. In both instances the estab -lished company smartly refrained from
completely taking over and rebranding.
YouTube and Instagram were allowed to
keep doing what they do best and to stay
small and nimble. Beacon clearly has es -tablished its own model for handling M&A,
one that involves close integration. But if
Henry and his colleagues want to make a
winning bet on the future of their industry,
they’d be better off giving VillageCar room
to remain the unique organization it is.
The Experts Respond
Marc McCabe is the product and business development lead at Airbnb.
There’s a trend toward
independence when an
acquisition is a potential
disrupter. Think of
Google and YouTube.
What Would You do?
SoMe ADVICe FroM THe HB r.or G CoMMunITY
henr Y needs proof that Village -Car solves customers’ problems
better than Beacon does and that
its business model is profitable
and scalable. If that’s not the case,
Henry should reconsider the invest-ment and certainly not change
Beacon’s business model.
robert Martigoni, senior busi -ness development manager,
AutoScout24
Keep the VillageCar brand and
slowly transform Beacon’s cul -ture to be more like the start-up’s.
eventually Beacon’s brand may
become obsolete, but not if there
are enough customers who value
its uniform service and reliability. If
this segment does become unprofit -able, the company can sell it to a
firm that still believes in the old-school model.
Akos Tolnai, CEO, AbilityMatrix
the venture should be treated as
a partnership, with shared brand -ing—such as “Beacon’s VillageCar.”
VillageCar has done an excellent
job of connecting with the younger
demographic, which is what Beacon
is trying to tap into, but Beacon has
an established name that is syn-onymous with experience, stability,
resilience, and credibility.
sumeet dhillon, project manager,
Lloyds Banking Group
eXper IenCe
128 Harvard Business review July–august 2013
Henry Has a point: In many ways
Village Car’s business is not that different
from Beacon’s. Both companies provide
mobility for customers by buying and
managing a fleet of vehicles and offer-ing those vehicles for a certain amount
of time. And despite what Tony says,
VillageCar’s model is not truly based on
sharing and community. That’s just the
spin the start-up uses to differentiate
itself from traditional rental car compa -nies. Real car sharing involves a peer-to-peer model, with no intermediary. At
RelayRides, for example, we don’t own
a fleet of vehicles, or even a single car.
We own the software that allows people
who have cars to share them with people
who don’t.
But there are also important distinctions
between Beacon and VillageCar. Tony is
right that the companies have different
purposes and target different audiences.
Beacon primarily serves people who
have cars of their own. VillageCar aims
to provide an alternative to vehicle
ownership. It serves urban young people
who have chosen a lifestyle that doesn’t
require them to own a car—they can
access one instead.
Beacon’s corporate brand is designed
to appeal to business travelers. VillageCar
is seen as an innovative, technology-focused start-up. Trying to merge the two
brands would be a complete turnoff for
VillageCar users—and possibly for Beacon
customers, too.
Henry needs to take these differences
into account when making his recom -mendation. He should push for integra-tion, but only to a point. Everything that
isn’t customer facing should be merged,
as Henry and Annabel both advocate.
Beacon should combine the back-end
operations—fleet acquisition, mainte -nance, and disposal. Inefficiencies here
are most likely what’s holding VillageCar
back, and this is where Beacon can offer
its strengths.
However, the customer needs to see
two distinct brands. Tony’s analogy to
Toyota and Lexus is apt. Those brands
are completely different in terms of what
they stand for and the kinds of audiences
they attract. Similarly, the VillageCar and
Beacon brands need to coexist separately.
Making one a sub-brand of the other
would be a mistake.
I can imagine handling it this way: Each
of Beacon’s locations would have two
counters—one for the Beacon brand, the
other for VillageCar. That way the two
brands would share buildings, systems,
and fleets, but their customers would have
distinct experiences. VillageCar customers
could still rent by the hour and choose the
car they want—and if they prefer, forgo the
counter altogether.
The underlying aims of the VillageCar
acquisition are to give Beacon access to
adjacent markets and to help the start-up
run a more profitable business. If Bea -con treats Village Car just like its other
acquisitions, it risks missing out on both
opportunities.
How to handle the VillageCar acquisi-tion is not an easy decision, and Henry
has to keep all the immediate financial
aspects in mind. But he also needs to
pay attention to what’s happening in the
economy at large. There’s a clear trend
away from ownership and consumption.
With household incomes flat over the past
30 years, it’s challenging for consumers to
buy assets, especially ones that depreciate
quickly, as cars do. Although VillageCar
may not use a true sharing model, it is at
least moving in the right direction.
HBR Reprint R1307M
Reprint Case only R1307X
Reprint Commentary only R1307Z
Andre Haddad is the CEO of RelayRides.
Henry should push for
integration—to a point.
Everything that isn’t
customer facing should
be merged.
HBR .ORg
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