Terrorism and Homeland Security
Please review chapter 4. Then write a full 3-page paper which addresses the below three topics.
Your paper must have at least two references. One needs to be your book and the other must be a scholarly journal article or quality book. You can’t use encyclopedia or dictionary type of sources.
1.Summarize: The Media as a Weapon
2.Describe: The Internet and Terrorism
3.Summarize: The Contagion Effect
CHAPTER 4: Terrorism and the Media
LEARNING OBJECTIVES
After reading this chapter, you should be able to:
> Discuss the role of the media in constructing social reality.
> Explain the tension between security forces and the media.
> Describe how the media can be viewed as a weapon.
> Explain how news frames are used to present a story.
> Describe the special relationship between terrorism and television.
> Explain how the Internet has impacted terrorism.
> Summarize various positions regarding bias in the news media.
> Define the contagion effect.
> Debate the issues of freedom of the press and censorship.
James Oliver Rigney, Jr. (October 17, 1948–September 16, 2007), whose pen name was Robert Jordan, began publishing a massive fantasy series entitled The Wheel of Time in 1990. Sadly, he passed away in 2007, but the 14-volume series is scheduled to be completed by Brandon Sanderson. The books tell stories of a world where demons fly, women weave special powers from a mythical city called Tar Valon, young men and women seek their destinies, and good forces battle evil for control of creation. Of course, the series is the product of Rigney’s imagination, yet the books contain quite a bit of truth about the human experience. One theme that occurs over and over throughout the series is the way tales are passed by word of mouth. Readers are allowed to experience men and women struggling against evil through the eyes of the main protagonists. After the confrontations, the story spreads through fictional kingdoms and the stories change. By the time they are told for the fifth, sixth, and seventh times, the stories do not resemble the original narrative. This is the way human beings share stories, and not merely the product of entertaining fiction.
On May 2, 2011, commandos from the U.S. Navy’s elite SEAL Team Six landed in a compound north of Islamabad, Pakistan. Their target was one of the most infamous terrorists of all times, Osama bin Laden. The raid was successful. Shortly after the raid President Barack Obama called President George Bush to give him the news. A few minutes later President Obama came on the major networks and announced that Osama bin Laden was dead. Then the stories of the stories started to spread. Military experts and former commandos first appeared on cable television to give “authoritative” accounts of the raid. Network news broadcasts and nationally syndicated newspapers expanded stories of the raid the following day, complete with illustrations and graphics. The White House released an official version of the raid. A few days later a SEAL publicly contested the official version, and television producers began focusing on documentaries to explain what “really” transpired. Within weeks there were several versions of the story about the death of the world’s most wanted terrorist.
Events become stories in literature and in day-to-day life. Most stories are forgotten, but some of them are repeated. Twice-told stories evolve into sagas, and sagas change to legends. The Wheel of Time series demonstrates this process through literary fiction. The many versions of Osama bin Laden’s death arose in the world of electronic mass-mediated information. Almost everyone who had a version of the story tried to get an account of the incident publicized, including al Qaeda. While this is the manner in which humans have always transmitted their stories, the process develops much more rapidly in the world of modern mass communication. Both security forces and terrorists want their version of the story publicized, and each side wants to control the media environment for one simple reason: The various media are not and cannot be neutral; they are a weapon.
The Media and the Social Construction of Images
Jeffery Ian Ross (2007) raises several important points about the relationship of terrorism to the news media. In essence, many criminologists and analysts discuss it, but there remains much to be learned. Terrorism requires interdisciplinary research techniques because it involves so many aspects of the human experience, and its relationship with the media has not been fully explored. While there are a number of studies about terrorism and the media, they tend to refer to the same scholarly sources. Ross concludes that the range of publications and research adds very little new knowledge.
news media:
As used in this text, refers to television, radio, and print journalism. It also refers to newer sources on the Internet, including news reporting services, the blogosphere, website pages, and propaganda broadcasts.
Ross believes that there are several areas in need of new research but that we do know something about the relationship between the media and terrorism. First, as discussed in Chapter 2, meanings are socially created, and Ross demonstrates that reporting is part of the social construction of terrorism. Second, terrorists are aware of the power of the media and seek to manipulate their message through it. Third, while the media enhances the power of terrorism, it does not cause it. Finally, terrorists will increasingly use the Internet to communicate as the relationship between the media and terrorism grows stronger in the future.
While more interdisciplinary research is needed, Ross is quite correct about the issues around terrorism and the media. Terrorism involves symbolic communication, usually aimed at an audience far beyond the immediate victims of violence. Alex Schmid and Albert Jongman (2005, p. 21) write that terrorism is designed to communicate specific messages to a select audience. Nancy Snow (2006) points out that terrorism is such an effective communication device that governments respond by trying to send their own messages through the media. Communication develops in three primary manners. The first, and most obvious, involves the reporting of terrorist events. Media exposure magnifies events, campaigns, and causes, and both terrorists and governments attempt to manipulate reports so that they are portrayed in a favorable light. This is especially true as it applies to television, but it is applicable to all news reporting. Second, the media plays a major role in creating the social definition of terrorism. It can, for example, globalize a local event or personalize a global event on a local level. Third, the World Wide Web has become a conduit for propaganda and communication. In any form, terrorism sends a message.
Some scenes have become all too familiar. A hooded member of Black September stands on a hotel balcony in Olympic Village. Elsewhere, a hijacker forces an airplane pilot to stick his head out the cockpit window while the hijacker fires a pistol into the air. On the Internet, a fanatic stands behind a blindfolded and rope-bound hostage, reading a religious proclamation claiming that the innocent hostage represents evil. After the proclamation, the terrorist kicks his hostage to the floor, pulls out a long knife, and slowly beheads the hostage while crying out, “God is great!” Scenes like this play out time and time again on television, on the Internet, on radio talk shows, and in newspaper stories and pictures. The meaning of terrorism is socially constructed, and the media provide a large part of the interpretation (Munson, 2008).
Popular Media Misconceptions
Everybody in the public eye wants to use the media to his or her advantage; interest groups, including governments and terrorists, compete for favorable labels and images. Daya Thussu (2006) states that the United States’ perspective on terrorism has dominated the international media since 9/11. This is due to the media’s ability to create and sustain the social image of terrorism. Thussu refers to this power as mythmaking, and the myths circulated by television news shape the worldview of those who watch. Such myths and misconceptions are presented far beyond the West, and they have defined social reality after 9/11 in many parts of the world. If social constructs are created by collective definitions, the power of the media helps to define the boundaries of those constructs.
According to Thussu, the media’s presentation of terrorism is dominated by several simplified stories presented and re-presented on 24-hour cable news networks. This type of reporting leads viewers to believe that terrorism is the result of Islamic radicalism, and it results in other falsehoods and misconceptions in the minds of viewers. Viewers are encouraged to accept a few isolated, simple facts about complicated issues and to accept misappropriated labels. Every event is portrayed in a moralistic tone.
Islam suffers from cable news simplifications. Viewers are encouraged to believe that radicalism defines Islam and that all Muslims believe exactly the same thing. There is no difference between Hezbollah, Hamas, and al Qaeda. In fact, the religious radicals have replaced the Soviet Union as a cold war rival to the West, and the only way they can be confronted is to respond with military force. Not only is Islam defined by radicals, but reports gradually demonize the entire religion. When Muslims appear, they are described with negative labels, such as “radical cleric,” “violent Wahhabi,” or “Islamic militant.”
Other myths become subtly incorporated as the larger image takes shape, and they are not limited to religion. When reporting on terrorism in general, the media exaggerates the threat of weapons of mass destruction. They also use simple catchphrases or accept the simplifications that politicians use to popularize a point. Phrases like “broken borders” and “war on terrorism” create images that become reality after they are used again and again. Thussu (2006), critical of American counterterrorist policy, feels media myths distort the issues surrounding terrorism.
Topics selected for coverage distort images, and unselected topics go unnoticed. Steven Chermak and Jeffrey Gruenewald (2006) found this was true in reporting on domestic terrorism after a content analysis of stories in American newspapers. David Altheide (2007) says that the United States “discovered” international terrorism after the attacks of September 11, 2001. Media coverage of terrorism, however, focused on fear and sensationalism. As a result, one of the main issues concerning terrorism, the change in American foreign policy, did not receive the same amount of coverage. Politicians, Altheide argues, transformed the link between America’s fear of crime to America’s fear of terrorism, and the media increased this fear. As a result, the United States took the lead in countering international terrorism, but the media did not analyze that aspect of the story. That is, American foreign policy changed, but this generally went unreported and unanalyzed.
Many media analysts criticize reporting that is sympathetic to governmental positions, assuming that the media’s job is to present alternatives to official actions. Some critics point to issues such as reporters embedded with military units and stories that rely on senior law enforcement or military personnel as their only sources. For example, the Israeli press was criticized for not opposing the government’s decision to target terrorist leaders for assassination. Media analysts have also criticized the American press for writing reports favorable to security forces (see Korn, 2004; Rozen, 2009; Steuter and Wills, 2010). Sometimes it seems that the media’s job is to uncover the hidden “truth” behind a policy and insist that government officials follow the wisdom of the press. Such media representations may place security forces at risk.
Roberto Valdeon (2009) argues that reporting about terrorism in Spain has framed the struggle with the Basque Nation and Liberty (ETA). According to his research, Spanish journalists tend to capture the violence behind terrorist activities, but international journalists tend to look at the ETA in a different light. They tend to refer to the ETA as “separatists” instead of “terrorists.” For example, although the international media reports the pain and ensuing chaos after ETA bombing attacks, many times they refer to the attack as part of the Basque separatist movement with ETA separatists conducting the attack. Valdeon examines the nuances of language, but the argument can be taken further. Since terrorists are so dependent on the media to expand their aura, such softening of terminology may prolong a conflict and place security forces at risk. Despite claims of objectivity and the public’s “right to know,” when the news media make a report, they automatically become part of the story. Reporting about terrorism cannot be neutral.
Tension between Security Forces and the Media
Although some scholars believe the media favors governments, police and security forces frequently find themselves at odds with this media power (see Nacos, 2002). On the one hand, they compete for favorable media coverage. On the other hand, governments exhibit a strong disdain for the press because media social constructions often run counter to governmental objectives and policies. Paul Wilkinson (1997) argues that governments seek to harness the power of the media for social control. For example, in hostage situations, security forces are responsible for the fate of the victims. Reporters often do not focus on the security mission of such incidents because they are under tremendous pressure to be first with the story, and they have their own agendas when reporting the story. As a result, Wilkinson concludes, law enforcement and military goals often conflict with the goals of the reporters.
Whereas Thussu concludes that the social meanings created by news segments favor governmental policy, security forces come to the opposite conclusion. Within everyday police or military operations it is not uncommon to hear many statements criticizing the media. Chiefs of police and military commanders generally do not respect or trust media figures or reporters, and their attitudes are reflected by line personnel. Specialized command units are often created within police agencies to portray a favorable image to reporters, and U.S. military forces include public relations units when they go to war.
Police and security forces officially represent the social order, and they are charged with maintaining governmental authority. They see themselves as servants of the public interest in the United States and other Western democracies. In addition, they believe they make decisions for the public good. They perceive themselves to be the forceful extension of democracy. They think reporters are only trying to gather sensationalistic stories. Practitioners understand the reality of media coverage and seek to limit and control coverage (Parent and Onder, 2001). Scholars like Douglas Keller (2006) think this may be somewhat ironic because media reporting generally favors security forces.
Police and military forces frequently try to take advantage of the media’s ability to define social reality. For example, in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the Pentagon invited print and electronic journalists to join combat units. They were known as embedded reporters. The military assumed that this would lead to better control of news reports. The results were partially realized. When compared to the free coverage during the 1991 Gulf War to oust Iraq from Kuwait and the subsequent enforcement of no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq from 1991 to 2003, reports submitted by embedded journalists to their editors were more favorable to American military units. After editing, however, published reports did not exhibit more favorable general coverage (Pfau et al., 2004).
embedded reporters:
Refers to reporters who placed inside military units during a combet operation.
The Media as a Weapon
The late Richard Clutterbuck once concluded that the media was similar to a loaded gun lying in the street. The first person to pick it up got to choose how to use it. Governments see the media as that loaded gun. If they pick it up, as by embedding reporters, they can use it to their benefit. Police executives and military officers are frequently trained in media manipulation. They want to make skillful use of the weapon when they pick it up.
Terrorists also recognize the power of the media as a weapon. Ayman al Zawahiri, a leader of al Qaeda, views the media as one of the tools in al Qaeda’s arsenal. First, any attack, especially if it is sensational, can dramatize the struggle. Major attacks draw major media coverage, and although the reports are not favorable among the enemy audience, they play well with sympathizers of al Qaeda. Second, Zawahiri can turn to his own media relations group. When he ran Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Zawahiri relied on a suborganization devoted to public relations; since joining al Qaeda, he continues to rely on such an organization. Third, Zawahiri uses his own writings to justify terrorism. He writes books and pamphlets, playing on sympathy for Muslims victimized throughout the world. Finally, along with other jihadists, he uses the Internet (Aboul-Enein, 2004).
Counterterrorist researchers from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point find that literature from violent extremists frequently reveals important information about their organizations and strategies (Brachman and McCants, 2006). Steven Corman and Jill Schiefelbein (2006), from Arizona State University, examine literature from militant Islamic groups to determine their media strategies. Their analysis shows that jihadists are keenly aware of the media’s ability to influence the social construction of reality. Jihadist texts reveal three media strategies. First, they seek legitimacy for their movement, especially wanting to justify acts of violence to other Muslims. Second, they want to spread their message and increase sympathy for their militant interpretation of religion. Third, their opponents, both the West and Muslims with a different interpretation of Islam, are targeted for intimidation.
Self-Check
> How do media outlets construct an image?
> Describe the tension between security forces and the media.
> How can the media be turned into a weapon?
News Frames and Presentations
Although communication scholars debate the definition, David Levin (2003) says reporting patterns are packaged in segments called news frames. The purpose of a news frame is to assemble words and pictures to create a pattern surrounding an event. The news becomes a symbolic representation of an event in which the audience is allowed to participate from a distance. Television and other media spin the event so that it can be translated into the understanding of popular culture. They use rhetoric and popular images to set the agenda, and the drama becomes the hook to attract an audience.
news frames:
Visual, audible, or written packages used to present the news. Communication scholars do not agree on a single definition, but news frames generally refer to the presentation of the news story. They contain a method for beginning and ending the story, and they convey the importance of characters and actions as the story is told.
News frames form the basis for communicating symbols. Karim Karim (2001, pp. 18–19) says the news frame creates a narrative for understanding a deadly drama. Characters are introduced, heroes and villains are defined, and victims of violence become the suffering innocents. The people who produce the frame provide their interpretation to the audience. Because the news frame exists within the dominant political context of the producers, it is not necessary to expend a great amount of energy on propaganda. The audience has been indoctrinated by journalists and mainstream reporters who present governmental officials as protectors and terrorists as villains. The news frame provides the “correct” symbolism for the consumer.
Simon Cottle (2006) believes that news frames help “mediatize” the presentation of terrorism; that is, they shape the way an event is communicated. The news frame is used by all media, but it is especially applicable to television. The news frame, although intentionally used, is one of the least understood aspects of broadcast journalism because its complexity goes unnoticed. Discussions of news frames usually focus on a specific story, or they involve reducing ideas to common elements. Actually, Cottle says, selecting from among the different styles of news frames presents an issue in a particular fashion. The classic approach in television is the reporting frame. It is usually short and designed to provide the latest information. Although facts and figures are presented, the story fails to focus on context or background. It is superficial, reducing reality to violent actions and reactions, while the underlying causes of conflict are ignored.
reporting frame:
The simplest form of a news frame. It is a quick, fact-driven report that summarizes the latest information about a story. It does not need to contain a beginning or an end, and it assumes that the consumer understands the context of the facts.
Types of Frames
Other frames complement the reporting frame, according to Cottle. A dominant frame presents a story from a single point of view. An authority figure or institution defines the story in this type of frame. Closely related is the conflict frame, which presents a story frame with two views, each side having experts or witnesses to support a position. A contention frame summarizes a variety of views, and investigative frames champion the role of the press as the protectors of democracy. Cottle identifies other frames designed to serve the community, enhance collective decision making, and enrich social understanding of an event (see Expanding the Concept: Communication Frames). Frames can also campaign for a single interpretation of an event or provide in-depth coverage beyond the shallowness of a reporting frame. Finally, Cottle says, television news presents a mythic frame, which reinforces deeply held values. This frame is frequently used to depict those people who have sacrificed their lives for a cause. The combination of all these communication frames complicates the presentation of the news on terrorism.
EXPANDING THE CONCEPT: Communication Frames
Simon Cottle (2006) says that news frames are complex because they are composed of a variety of communication frames. Terrorism is reported within the following types of frames:
• Reporting frames: superficial, short, and laced with facts
• Dominant frames: one authority’s view
• Conflict frames: two sides, with experts
• Contention frames: a variety of positions
• Investigative frames: exposing corrupt or illegal behavior
• Campaigning frames: the broadcaster’s opinion
• Reportage frames: in-depth coverage with background
• Community service frames: information for viewers
• Collective interest frames: reinforce common values
• Cultural recognition frames: a group’s values and norms
• Mythic tales frames: hero stories
Source: Cottle, 2006.
Ambiguous Stories and News Frames
News frames give the story a structured meaning, but sometimes a story defies structure. The frame is centered on getting viewers’ attention, presenting information, and revealing the results. What happens when the results are inconclusive? Frank Durham (1998) answers this question by looking at the crash of TWA Flight 800, a passenger airliner that exploded over the Atlantic Ocean shortly after taking off from JFK Airport in New York City in 1996. Durham believes that the news frame works when a report is based on sources with definitive explanations of an event. There were no solid answers in the TWA crash, however, and no authority could emerge with a definitive story on the crash. Durham tracked reporting in 668 stories from the New York Times for one year following the explosion. Dominant news frames emerged, but all were proved incorrect.
Durham concludes that ambiguity destroys the ability to create a sustainable news frame. Reporters covering TWA 800 expected to find facts that would reveal a logical cause. They looked to terrorism, a missile strike, and finally mechanical error. In the first months following the crash, neither facts nor logical conclusions pointed to an answer. As a result, Durham says, the New York Times could not produce a news frame for the story.
Durham’s conclusion might have an interesting effect on understanding terrorism. If terrorism is reported in well-defined news frames, both the media and the consumer will assume that there is a political beginning, a violent process, and a logical end. If there is ambiguity about the story, however, the method by which reporters gather the story and present it becomes the story because there is no logical conclusion. Currently, most media outlets report terrorist events within the logic of a well-defined frame (see Althaus, 2002). When violence is ambiguous and continual, the frame loses meaning, and terrorism is reported as an endless cycle of violence. As Leon Uris (1977, p. 815) writes in Trinity, a novel about Anglo-Irish conflict in Ulster, there is no future in Ireland, just the cycles of the past. Cycles may not be amenable to news frames.
Beating the War Drum
Regardless, the news frame is a powerful instrument. It gives the media outlet covering an event the power to define it. Douglas Kellner (2002) knows that terrorism attracts attention, but he is critical of America’s typical news frame. After September 11, Kellner says, American television presented only one news frame, patterning the attack as a clash of civilizations and suggesting that only a military response would stop future attacks. The militants behind the strike responded in the same manner with diatribes filled with simplistic anti-Americanisms, and American and international news frames defined their reports of al Qaeda within the boundaries of militancy.
Rather than examine the complexity of the issues, Kellner says, television beat the war drum and called in a variety of terrorism experts who reflected the single view. Radio was even worse, engaging in sensationalistic propaganda. The process did not stop with news reporting. One national network broadcast patriot war movies after several days of news coverage. Whether postmodern or not, news frames simplified the cause and pointed to one logical solution: war. A military solution may well have been the proper answer to 9/11, but news frames presented no other option.
postmodern:
Describing the belief that modernism has ended; that is, some events are inexplicable, and some organizations and actions are naturally and socially chaotic and defy explanation. A postmodern news frame leaves the consumer thinking there are many possible conclusions.
The media also offered long-term extensive coverage of military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. It can be argued that images of suffering and death change public perceptions. The media brings stark images into American homes. Even if there is a bias to support American foreign policy—and most policy makers would vehemently argue there is not—access to new types of digital media can expand perspectives. For example, if the news frames of cable television present one ideal, there are a variety of other interpretations available in other media (Zimmerman, 2007). Perhaps the focus should be on audiences. Consumers who do not want to understand other perspectives or who choose not to be informed might be more responsible for misunderstanding terrorism than the commercial news organizations framing a story.
Beating the Wrong Drum
While some scholars have argued that the various media have taken an uncritical look at U.S. military actions in the first part of the twenty-first century, other scholars suggest that the media have the wrong focus. Brigitte Nacos, Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, and Robert Shapiro (2010), do not question the media’s focus on counter terrorism, but they do suggest that the focus is improperly centered on military and law enforcement action overseas. These actions are important, but domestic actions are just as important. The problem is that the media have virtually ignored domestic security issues.
The public depends on the mass media for information about issues. In turn, public perceptions formed by news stories frequently set the agenda for political policies. There is a strong correlation between the issues that the public thinks are important and the actions taken by political leaders. Communication scholars argue that one of the most important roles for the free press in a democracy is to make sure that critical issues stay in the news. At the same time, heightened competition for audiences creates an atmosphere in newsrooms in which shocking and dramatic information trump complex stories dealing with non-sensational issues. In other words, attacks against known terrorist leaders in Yemen or Pakistan draw more attention than mundane congressional hearings on port security. This concerns Nacos and her colleagues.
Nacos’s study of several hundred news accounts in the first decade of counterterrorist action after 9/11 reveals that the American news media did not believe there was a need to focus on domestic security. The media’s main focus was on perceived threats overseas. For example, Nacos and her colleagues examined all of the terrorism stories on ABC News, CBS News, and NBC News during a 39-month period. The three networks aired a total of 85 stories concerned with homeland security. During the same time frame the networks ran 373 stories dealing with the threat of terrorism. Most of the stories about security were aired after some type of public security breach. The researchers believe their findings indicated television’s preference for sensational events.
The danger in this reporting is not in beating the war drum. The threat of terrorism is real and it demands some type of response. While some scholars are quick to condemn any type of military action or the use of deadly force in response to political violence, Nacos and her colleagues did not question the necessity to act with force. Their focus was on the national security agenda as portrayed by media reporting. There is a need to examine the threat, they argue, but the need for domestic security is just as important. By not analyzing the complex factors needed to secure the American public, the media has deemphasized homeland security. The researchers conclude that this is a dangerous situation.
Terrorism and Television
Benjamin Barber (1996, pp. 76–83) analyzes the problems of news frames and popular images on television in Jihad vs. McWorld. The title suggests that he is examining the world of the jihadists, but in fact he is looking at global economic inequities and the resulting ideologies that drive people into different systems. Instead of moving people to discuss problem solutions, Barber believes, the media flourishes on one overriding factor: entertainment. He humorously calls the 24-hour news networks the infotainment telesector.
infotainment telesector:
A sarcastic term to describe cable news networks. It refers to news organizations producing stories to entertain their audiences under the guise of presenting objective information.
The infotainment telesector is not geared for depth; it is designed to create revenue. “News” becomes banter between a news anchor and a guest, and debates devolve into shouting matches between controversial representatives. Issues are rarely discussed. Hosts perpetually interrupt their guests or provide answers to their own questions. Coverage of many shows is driven by a pleasing personality who either lacks intellectual depth or does an excellent job hiding it. Morning news shows are full of interviewers who discover issues obvious to the rest of the world and who shake their heads in wonderment when common knowledge is revealed.
These contexts of the infotainment telesector and the desire to beat the other networks have a negative effect on homeland security. Documents are leaked, confidential plans are unveiled, and vulnerabilities are exposed. Terrorism is made more horrific to create better drama. News film is constantly replayed, giving the illusion that attacks are repeated time and time again. News hosts spend time interviewing reporters from the field who speculate on the facts surrounding an event. This leads to a dilemma for policy makers. Freedom of the press is guaranteed in the First Amendment to the Constitution, but television coverage frequently becomes part of the story it is covering.
Over the years several studies have pointed to the close relationship between terrorism and television. H. H. A. Cooper (1977a) was one of the first analysts to point to the issues, explaining that terrorist acts were made-for-TV dramas. Abraham Miller (1982) published one of the first books on the subject, pointing out that television brought terrorist events into our homes. More recently, Yassen Zassoursky (2002) says that television and the Internet give terrorists an immediate international audience. Gadt Wolfsfeld (2001) says acts have become so graphic and sensational that they grab media attention. In one of the best standard-setting studies, Alex Schmid and Jany deGraaf (1982) say that the relationship between terrorism and the media is so powerful that Western democracies may need to take drastic action and even implement censorship.
made-for-TV dramas:
Refers to news stories that will keep viewers’ attention. H. H. A. Cooper was among the first analysts to recognize the drama that terrorism presented for television.
David Levin (2003) says that the purpose of television news coverage is to keep the audience primed with emotion and excitement. News organizations use a standard drama pattern to accomplish this. It is designed to keep the viewer tuned to the station. The attention-getting theme is the essence of the drama.
A drama pattern is constant in any unfolding event. On-the-scene reporters send reports back to the anchor, who calmly sits at the desk gathering information, sometimes asking urgent questions to clarify issues for the audience. The hidden meaning of the report intimates that the station has crucial information on “breaking news,” and members of the audience need to know it. The anchor is the authority figure who is able to process information for the viewers. Reporters are the researchers sending the latest information back from the scene. The overriding message of the drama is “stay tuned.” It is the pattern of Greek tragedy, and it works for television—whether covering the weather, terrorism, election results, or Football Night in America (see Expanding the Concept: TV Drama Patterns).
EXPANDING THE CONCEPT: TV Drama Patterns
What makes a good news drama?
Change: The situation is changing and the outcome is unknown.
Information: The latest news and breaking news about the situation is on this station.
Stay tuned: You must keep watching; the best is yet to come.
Expertise: Only this station is qualified to explain the situation.
On-the-scene reports: Reporters are there telling you what is happening, even when they do not know.
Control: The anchor controls the information from the studio, giving you a vicarious feeling of control.
Participation: You are allowed to vicariously participate in the event.
Money: The station breaks away to sponsors but promises even more drama after the commercial.
End of the Western Monopoly
Control of the drama pattern was held in a Western monopoly until recently. New networks such as al Jazeera and al Arabia have challenged the West’s—especially the American—hold on international news. If there is an effect from 24-hour cable news slanted toward a particular interpretation, new national perspectives influence it (Gilboa, 2005). In addition, localized networks present other perspectives and definitions of terrorism. Judith Harik (2004, pp. 160–161, 189) points out that Hezbollah has learned to do this by projecting a positive image on Lebanese national television. She says Hezbollah took advantage of al Manar television, Lebanon’s network, as the Israelis withdrew from Lebanon and again during the al Aqsa Intifada.
al Jazeera:
An international Arabic television network.
al Manar:
Hezbollah’s television network.
al Aqsa Intifiada:
An uprising sparked by Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount with a group of armed escorts in September 2000. The area is considered sacred to Jews, Christians, and Muslims. Muslims were incensed by the militant aspect of Sharon’s visit.
Al Manar television presented a sympathetic view of the al Aqsa uprising, and Hezbollah was quick to take advantage of al Manar’s 24-hour coverage. The method of reporting was the key to success. The news was interspersed with inspirational religious messages. Hezbollah was able to get al Manar to focus on Hezbollah’s role in the Intifada and to run programs on its former glories. In an effort to demoralize the Israelis, al Manar broadcast pictures of Israeli casualties and ended with the question: “Who will be next?”
Power came in the form of visual images. Harik believes al Manar television helped to elevate Hezbollah to heroic status. She cites one example whose effect swept through Lebanon: Faced with heavy fighting in a West Bank village, Israeli forces withdrew. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), using Israeli mass media, denied it had abandoned the village. Al Manar presented another view. When the Israelis withdrew, Hezbollah fighters entered the village along with Palestinian mujahideen. Hezbollah raised its flag over the village, and someone took a picture. As the IDF was denying it had retreated, al Manar showed the village with the Hezbollah flag flying high overhead. Hezbollah achieved a media victory.
Television makes the viewing audience participants in a terrorist attack. Viewers have short- and long-term psychological damage after seeing terror attacks on television, and it shapes anxiety and attitudes. Anat Shoshoni and Michelle Sloan (2008) measured the reactions of 300 university students in Israel after they had been exposed to terrorist violence on television. Looking at levels of anxiety and anger, they wanted to see if attitudes and perceptions of the enemy and the willingness to accept negative group stereotypes would be affected. Unlike the immediate experiences of anxiety and anger, attitudes are generally formed over a long period of time.
The experiment began with a survey to measure anxiety and attitude. After the survey, students were shown two seven-minute video clips, one of a terrorist attack and the other of nonterrorist violence from the same group, and they conducted a second set of measurements. As they had expected, Shoshoni and Sloan found that anger and anxiety increased, but they also saw that long-term attitudes changed within the same time frame. In other words, the violent vignettes not only increased short-term fear; they were also responsible for fear and anxiety long after the students viewed the videos.
Television seeks drama, and terrorism provides an unfolding dramatic event. Tyler Cowen (2006) argues that terrorism is a spectacle that has a focal point, various actors, and a storyline. Television news coverage works well with such spectacles. Dramatic moving shots can be played over and over, while in-depth analysis gives background to an eager audience. Terrorist leaders need the unfolding drama, too. It allows them to motivate followers and increase control of an organization.
Televised Gender Stereotypes
Television also impacts the way women are viewed in terrorist organizations. Although women have played significant roles in modern terrorism and have frequently assumed positions of leadership, television tends to portray women as minor figures in the male-dominated occupation. Brigitte Nacos (2009) finds that television depicts female terrorists in a manner similar to the way women politicians are portrayed. Terrorist organizations use typical gender clichés that are, in turn, captured and restated in television reporting. The result is that women are cast in supportive and nurturing roles devoid of any personality characteristics required for tough political action. Television generates the same stereotypes for female terrorists and politicians.
Nacos presents several images created by television news frames. She discusses the “physical appearance” frame, which focuses on the way a woman looks in front of the camera. The “family connection” frame is used to create the appearance of a “typical housewife.” The “terrorist for the sake of love” depicts a lovelorn female entering a life of terrorism due to her relationship with her male companion. The “women’s lib” frame paints a picture of a nontraditional woman seeking to define herself in a more masculine role, as does the “tough as men—tougher than men” news frame. Finally, news frames also depict women as bored, frustrated housewives out of touch with reality.
The result of such depictions, Nacos concludes, is that television misrepresents the threat of terrorism by misstating the dangerous role that female terrorists play. Instead of looking at the actual activities of women, they are portrayed with gender stereotypes. The traditional method of framing female politicians has weakened in recent years, Nacos says, but the same is not true for the images of women terrorists. As a result, women are able to use their television-generated image to avoid detection. Gender-biased reports weaken our ability to respond to terrorism.
Self-Check
> What is a news frame?
> How are news frames used to cover terrorism?
> Describe the relationship between terrorism and television.
The Internet and Terrorism
The Internet impacts news coverage of all events and often exceeds the ability of the established media to report an event. It is also used for communication, propaganda, reporting, recruiting, training, and as a tactical weapon. Either side can directly control information or hack into opponents’ websites. Both sides can mine data and gather intelligence. The Internet can be a weapon, and either side may use it effectively. Terrorists have learned to use it on several levels.
Todd Hinnen (2004) says that the Internet is used most frequently as a communication device and that sending unsecure e-mail is the most common usage for terrorists. Unsecure e-mail is easy to penetrate, and evidence from it is frequently used in criminal prosecutions. Hinnen cites charges against a Colombian terrorist group for arms trafficking based on evidence gathered from e-mail. Terrorists, aware of the dangers of unsecure e-mail, use a variety of methods to hide communications. One way, Hinnen writes, is to give an e-mail account’s password to several members of a group. A member can then draft a message, but never send it. Other members log on, read the draft, and then delete it after all have viewed it. Because the message is never sent, there is no e-mail record. A second method involves setting up a secure website, such as terroristgroup.com, with its own e-mail server. All members of a terrorist group would receive an address, such as jsmith@terroristgroup.com. If e-mail stays exclusively within the secure site, it is difficult to trace.
Terrorists understand the power of the Internet. They run their own websites, and they sometimes hack into existing sites to broadcast propaganda videos. Yassen Zassoursky (2002) says that these abilities enhance the power of terrorist groups, and he believes that the Internet’s communication capabilities allow terrorist groups an opportunity to attack the global community. Sonia Liff and Anne Sofie Laegren (2003) reinforce Zassoursky’s thesis by pointing to Internet cafés. They say that cybercafés enhance the Internet’s striking power because they make communication untraceable.
Steganography is frequently said to be one of the Internet’s greatest vulnerabilities in light of criminal and terrorist communication. The process refers to embedding hidden information in a picture, message, or another piece of information. The process is not new. A Roman general once shaved the head of a slave, had a secret message tattooed on the slave’s head, and waited for the slave’s hair to grow back. When the message was covered, he sent the slave to the recipient with instructions to shave the slave’s head (Lau, 2003). Obviously, the Internet presents possibilities for faster communication, and it does not present the risk of permanently displaying the message if the messenger goes bald! A steganographic message can be encrypted, placed in plain text in a hidden file, or sent on a covert channel (Westphal, 2003). There are numerous potential purposes for using steganography in terrorism. It could be used to hide communications, steal information from security forces or an organization within the critical infrastructure, or provide opportunities for electronic attack (Wingate, 2006).
steganography:
Refers to embedding a hidden encoded message on an Internet site.
There are two positions on the steganographic threat to the United States. Stephan Lau (2003) says one position claims that steganography is used by terrorist groups to communicate and launch cyberattacks. After 9/11, for example, media reports claimed that al Qaeda was hiding information in steganographic images. Some believe that it will be used in denial-of-service attacks or to deface websites. Lau takes the other position, claiming that fear of steganography is the stuff of urban legends. Although steganography programs are readily available and difficult to detect or counter with security hardware, programs offering statistical analysis of data contained in any Internet transmission readily reveal irregularities and the location of a hidden image. Entrepreneurs are marketing these programs to corporations and governments, but Lau believes the threat is not in the hidden image. He says that there is no evidence to show that the use of steganography by terrorists is a threat. The real threat, Lau argues, is the American government’s enhanced ability to decipher private communications based on a threat that does not exist.
In the areas of propaganda, reporting, and public relations, the Internet has been a boon for terrorist groups. It allows terrorist groups to present messages and to portray images that will not appear in mainstream media. Paul Wilkinson (2006, pp. 144–157) says that terrorists have always used some medium for communication. In the past, it ranged from tavern gossip to handbills. Thus, it is logical to assume that the Internet serves the same purpose, now literally at the speed of light. Major terrorist groups run websites to present alternative views. For example, before its demise in 2009, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) ran a news service called EelamWebsite (http://www.eelamwebsite.com). Violent single-issue groups use the website for propaganda as well (see Expanding the Concept: As Sahaab versus al Hurra).
The Internet can also be used for recruitment and training. Abdul Bakier (2006b) finds Salafi jihadists using websites and e-mail to make training manuals available. The World Wide Web has become more important as growing numbers of females join the Salafi movement. One blogger, who identified herself as the mother of Osama, claims that the Internet gives women the opportunity to become mujahidat (female holy warriors). Bakier finds some sites specifically aimed at recruiting or retaining females. Other sites encourage suicide bombings. Discussion groups examine tactics and provide basic weapons orientation, and some militant scholars provide in-depth theological apologias to justify religious violence. One site has an entire first-aid course to deal with battlefield wounds. Bakier finds more and more groups using recruiting sites.
Salafi movement:
Used by orthodox Muslims to follow the Prophet and the elders of the faith. Militants narrow the use of the term and use it to justify violence. The Salafi movement refers to those people who impose Islam with force and violence.
EXPANDING THE CONCEPT: As Sahaab versus al Hurra
Al Qaeda’s media campaign has proved difficult for the United States to counteract. Al Qaeda’s underground video network, known as As Sahaab, wages an effective propaganda campaign using the Internet. Evan Kohlmann (2005), an NBC terrorism analyst, explains the process. Local camera operators film studio sequences of a propaganda statement or live-action footage of mujahedeen along the Pakistan–Afghanistan border. The footage is edited on a computer, dubbed or subtitled, and handed over to an Internet group called al Fajir, which posts links to the clip in Arab chat forums. (Ironically, most of these forums are hosted in North America.) Television networks pick up the broadcasts. Western networks heavily edit them, but, on networks like al Jazeera, they sometimes appear as full-length broadcasts, according to the Discovery Times Channel (2005). In its own media offensive, the United States launched al Hurra, an Arabic-language 24-hour satellite station, in early 2004. The results have been disappointing. One prominent Arab writer called the $62 million project the American Pravda, after the communist news organization in the former Soviet Union (Cochrane, 2004). The Discovery Times Channel agreed, stating that most Arabic-speaking viewers distrust the news produced by al Hurra. In essence, a few thousand dollars invested in website cams, PCs, and video software have made more of an impact than a multimillion-dollar television enterprise. The United States has yet to capitalize on the Internet for spreading propaganda.
Sources: Kohlmann, 2005; Discovery Times Channel, 2005; Cochrane, 2004.
The Internet is also used in target selection, reconnaissance, and, sometimes, as a tool to support an attack. Maps, satellite imagery, and diagrams provide ready-made intelligence sources. Stephen Ulph (2006a) sees terrorists increasingly using Internet searches to find economic targets. He believes this trend is notable because terrorists across the globe can unite and research a particular target in a matter of minutes. He also finds terrorist groups attracted to data mining. One terrorist training manual points out that it is possible to gather information on enemy targets simply by using the Internet. Ulph (2006b) also sees the Internet as a potential weapon. Terrorists want to take hacker warfare to their enemies. Groups post methods to steal passwords and instructions for breaking into secure areas. There are instructions on systems and denial-of-service attacks, as well. As a logistical tool, the Internet can also be used to assemble people for a violent action. Clearly, the Internet has become a weapon in many arsenals.
There is another side to the story. Security forces also use the Internet, and they do so effectively. Researchers have access to databases, government reports, and other information. Security forces also monitor websites and chat rooms (Wright, 2008). New laws in a number of countries have given law enforcement and intelligence agencies the authority to monitor Internet content for criminal activity, although such surveillance is controversial in Western democracies (Brown, 2009). Law enforcement networks in the Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) have the ability to share criminal investigative information, and they provide local, state, and federal law enforcement with secure communications. The Internet can thus be used against terrorism and other forms of criminal activity.
Self-Check
> How do terrorists use the Internet to communicate?
> What is the value of Internet propaganda?
> Is the Internet a potential weapon for terrorism? Why or why not?
Issues in the Media
Because the media is so powerful, the way issues are reported and communicated is hotly debated. For example, Fox News claims to be “fair and balanced.” Critics maintain it is not, but supporters believe that it presents objective reports. National Public Radio (NPR) reporting is debated in the same manner, except that critics believe that NPR has a liberal bias. Such debates are not easily resolved, and the arguments favoring one side or the other are frequently full of opinions rather than hard evidence. Before leaving the discussion of the media, it would be helpful to review some of these issues.
Liberal and Conservative Biases in Terrorism Reporting?
Most mainstream media claim objectivity when presenting information about terrorism. They know governments and terrorists are trying to manipulate news stories, so they seek an ideal—objectivity. Many reporters believe that it is their job simply to tell the truth. They seek to be fair and balanced, as Fox News claims to be. These assumptions are naïve, according to former CBS employee Bernard Goldberg (2003, pp. 103–114). All news comes with a slant, and reporters are expected to create news frames reflecting their outlet’s orientation. For people outside the newsroom, the debate is intense. At one end of the spectrum, critics claim that the media has a liberal bias. Critics fume, claiming that the print and electronic media are inherently anti-Western and anti-American (see Bozell, 2005; Anderson, 2005). These critics claim reporters are sympathizing with terrorism at worst or undermining the government at best.
Pundits and other nonscholars attack this position. They claim that the media has been taken over by conservatives. Conservative talk show hosts and guests banter about pseudo-facts, reinforcing right-wing ideology. Guests are invited on these programs only to be bombarded with conservative ranting. The critics claim that the news media is dominated by bullies and hatemongers who seek to silence any voice but their own. Reporting on terrorism cannot be objective in such a format—it is designed to create fear and limit individual freedom (see Anderson, 2005; Willis, 2005).
Is there bias in the coverage of terrorism? Some scholars think so, but it is much more subtle and complicated than the writers of popular diatribes believe. Rather than joining the debate by measuring the amount of conservatism or liberalism in news content, Daniel Sutter (2001) analyzes the economic aspects of news production. He asks, What incentives would generate a bias, and why would a profit-making entity risk losing an audience? One of Sutter’s answers comes in the form of an analogy. Suppose the public is composed of 600 television news viewers who are liberal, moderate, or conservative. By statistical distribution, 300 viewers would fall in the middle, or moderate, category. The remaining 300 would divide equally between liberals and conservatives. A news organization, as a profit-making entity, has an incentive to attract the largest possible audience. If the news moved either to the right or left, it would be threatened with the loss of mainstream viewers. Sutter sees no incentive for a liberal or conservative bias. Or does it have a bias that is neither liberal nor conservative? (See Another Perspective: Media Ownership.)
ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE: Media Ownership
Edward Herman (1999) focuses on the social construction of reality and political bias when he examines the media, but not from the perspective of most critics. The bias is economic, he says, and it is dominated by multinational corporations. The American media is part of a vast propaganda machine promoting the values and goals of business corporations. He conducts case studies examining advertising, ownership, and content to demonstrate the point. Stories affecting corporate profits are manipulated in a positive way. Dictators are portrayed as moderate or benign when they favor corporate investments and profits, even as the same leaders repress or massacre their own citizens. Newspapers use catchphrases such as “free trade,” “third world elections,” and other simplifications to hide the powerful economic forces behind political action. The political bias is neither liberal nor anti-American; it is based in its market orientation.
There is a caveat in his logic, Sutter admits, because some media organization owners would be willing to sacrifice profit to stand for a political position. In addition, some journalists will insert their own feelings into a story even when these feelings do not reflect the owner’s position. These factors are countered by trends in the profit-driven media. First, if the entire media were to exhibit a bias, one owner would need to have a monopoly on all media outlets. One company can afford to take a position, Sutter says, but the entire industry will not. Second, journalism is a profession. Work is reviewed and approved by editors and reviewed by colleagues. Individual bias is readily identified, but each journalist or reporter thinks and presents news separately. This process prevents an overall bias in the industry. Third, as news organizations expand, there will be pressures for a bias to develop special audiences among liberals and conservatives. Yet the media will remain market-driven, and the entire industry will not take up the biases of a limited, specialized audience. Finally, news organizations are increasingly led by boards and groups of owners driven by the desire to make money. They do not have the incentive to introduce bias that alienates their mainstream viewers.
David Baron (2004) takes a different approach, suggesting that bias appears on two levels: the individual discretion of the reporter collecting information for a story and the public’s desire to watch or read the most captivating story. Small portions of a reporter’s individual bias may slip into the story, but the corporation presenting the news will limit it. The business wants the greatest number of viewers, hence revenue, it can attract; therefore, it keeps reporters focused on captivating issues. The organization also wants to tailor the report to the beliefs and values of the audience. Therefore, there is very little incentive for bias. The one exception deals with reporters’ salaries. Less objective news appealing to a specialized, politically biased audience can mean lower overall wages for reporters. Baron says that reporters who frame stories within a political bias do not need critical thinking and discernment skills. Therefore, station managers can pay them less and increase profits. There is a risk in this process, however, because bias may lower consumption, resulting in less income and lower profits. News corporations want to avoid risk and will keep major biases out of their stories.
Tim Groseclose and Jeffrey Milyo (2005) come to a different conclusion, stating that the American media has a liberal bias. Using multiple variables, Groseclose and Milyo selected a variety of media outlets, including newspapers, magazines, and television and radio news shows, to study. They limited their study to news items, eliminating editorials, commentaries, book reviews, and other opinion pieces from their study. They then selected think tanks and research organizations those media outlets used to provide information, guidance, and evaluation on governmental programs and policies. Next, they divided Congress into liberal and conservative members, and counted the numbers of times liberals and conservatives cited a think tank. Finally, they compared the number of times each selected news source cited the same think tank and compared this to the congressional numbers. They concluded that the news media cited the think tanks referenced by liberal members of Congress more than they cited the think tanks referenced by conservative members. Groseclose and Milyo concluded that the American news media has a strong liberal bias.
Fouzi Slisli (2000) is not concerned with a liberal or conservative orientation; instead, he focuses on the use of pejorative labels. He believes adjectives introduce bias into the news. Citing sensationalism and failure to conduct in-depth reporting, Slisli says that the American media is full of oversimplifications and stereotypes (see Another Perspective: Stereotypes and Media Reports). The media plays to the lowest level of understanding among its viewers. Large groups of people are lumped together in news reports with no intention of examining complexities. False categories are created to further simplify issues.
David Levin (2003) examines the reporting of peace processes, intimating that it has the problems of simplification, the inability of the audience to understand complexities, and a network’s desire to attract an audience. The news is aimed at particular audiences, and different organizations approach audiences in a variety of ways. Information and education stations approach the news differently than do 24-hour cable news networks that focus on entertainment and emotions. It is difficult to explain sufficiently well the nature of the conflict, the various political positions, internal fighting within governments and terrorist organizations, and other issues surrounding attempts to bring peace to areas such as Sri Lanka, the Basque region of Spain, Israel and Palestine, and Ireland. Many people prefer simplicity and entertainment. Thus, many news programs and some networks search for an unreflective audience, playing to the most susceptible members of the audience. Some producers even attempt to find a supermarket-tabloid audience by searching for the lowest common denominator among them, that is, people who want to be spoon-fed and entertained. These shows exploit emotions, favor sensation over facts, fail to examine issues in depth, and place entertainment value above information.
ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE: Stereotypes and Media Reports
Are American television reports on terrorism objective? Fouzi Slisli (2000) answers with a blunt NO! Citing sensationalism and failure to conduct in-depth reporting, Slisli says that large groups of people are portrayed without depth in American television. Terms such as fundamentalist, radical cleric, and terrorist are used by reporters who either fail to understand issues or sensationalize their reports.
Source: Slisli, 2000.
Information networks approach the same issues with different objectives. They seek to educate their audiences. Their shows are thoroughly researched and focused on the complexity of information. Their purpose is to inform, and they seek an audience that wants to reflect, criticize, and analyze. They will introduce the intricacies of competing interpretations of information and accept ambiguity as normal. When trying to bring peace to an area plagued by political violence and terrorism, subtlety and complexity are the norms.
Richard Miniter (2005) shifts the argument to accuracy. He states that the media used to have a conservative bias, but now it has tilted toward liberalism. This is not the problem, however. The issue for the media is that it is spreading incorrect information about terrorism. He identifies 22 misconceptions about terrorism accepted as truth by most newspapers, magazines, and broadcasters. The myths come from a variety of sources, including honest mistakes in reporting, American and foreign government disinformation, and contrived leaks. Although the myths are accepted by much of the media and the public, they obfuscate terrorism because they are untrue (see Another Perspective: Miniter’s Media Myths). Miniter is an investigative journalist, and he cites many credible sources. Other investigative journalists citing other credible sources disagree with some of his findings (for example, see Gordon and Trainor, 2006; Ricks, 2006).
There is another type of conservatism beyond popular definitions and classical political science definitions. Some institutions provide social stability and preserve the status quo of social structure (see Manning, 1976, pp. 102–103). The media may be playing this role far beyond exhibiting a liberal or conservative bias. Todd Fraley and Elli Roushanzamir (2006) say that the current conditions of subnational and supranational violence are shifting and distorting all media presentations of violence, including terrorism. They sadly conclude that the mass media is spreading more propaganda than news in a world dominated by media corporations. The flow and amount of information, however, could serve to raise the awareness of news consumers, creating a new critical media consciousness.
critical media consciousness:
The public’s understanding of the media and the way stories are presented. A critically conscious audience would not simply accept a story presented in a news frame. It would look for the motives for telling the story, how the story affected social constructs and actions, and hidden details that could cause the story to be told in another way.
News consumers need to develop analytical abilities that look beyond the news frame and examine the issues behind terrorism and other political events. If they do, Fraley and Roushanzamir believe, political freedom will expand throughout the world. If consumers remain at the current level of understanding, corporations will continue to remain in charge of mass media outlets, and emerging subnational and supranational groups—such as multinational terrorist organizations—will fight for control of emerging media. If the established media only stabilizes the existing social order, this will result in polarization with other forms of media, such as the Internet.
The Contagion Effect
Some analysts are not as concerned about the content of press coverage as they are about its role in spreading terrorist violence; they wonder if media coverage inspires more terrorism. There are many vehement opinions, but this issue reintroduces the problem described by Jeffery Ian Ross (2007). Research indicates that the media do not cause terrorism, but the effects on areas such as crimes by copycats are unclear. There is definitely a need for further research.
copycats:
Refers to people who imitate other criminals after viewing, hearing, or reading a story about a crime. A copycat copies the targets and methods of another criminal.
ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE: Miniter’s Media Myths
Richard Miniter says that popular images, conservative and liberal views, and urban legends are popularized through the media. Many of these media-based “truths” cannot stand the test of investigation. A selection of myths follows.
The Myth
The Truth
In an e-mail, Lt. Col. Oliver North allegedly warned Senator Al Gore about Osama bin Laden.
North was testifying to another senator about Abu Nidal, a Middle Eastern terrorist.
Former Soviet Union backpack nuclear devices have been stolen by al Qaeda.
The weapons appear to be secure and are more difficult to steal than popularly believed.
Jihadists are most likely to infiltrate from Mexico.
Canadian media has little respect for the abilities of Canadian police and intelligence services, and jihadist sympathizers operate a strong lobby in Canada. Miniter says the evidence indicates that jihadists will come from the north.
Conservative media personalities argue that political correctness keeps us from targeting via racial profiles terrorists who travel by air. If we could use racial profiles, we could identify terrorists.
Racial profiling does nothing to single out terrorists within ethnic groups. Comparing air travelers with a comprehensive terrorist knowledge base would work, but civil libertarians, both liberal and conservative, prevent that.
Liberal media personalities claim that the defense contracting company Halliburton made tremendous profits in Iraq.
Halliburton has shown little profit from Iraq, both for investors and for conspiracy theorists.
A popular Internet and Arab-media myth states that Israeli intelligence warned Jews to avoid the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.
Although the exact number is unknown, hundreds of Jews died in the 9/11 attack, including five Israelis.
Miniter believes that all media serve as a source of disinformation. The primary reasons are sloppy reporting, editors who fail to check facts, and rumors that are accepted as truth. People gravitate to belief in conspiracies as a result.
Miniter says that the American government can help stop disinformation by making its reports readily available and by releasing the entire transcripts of officials’ interviews before items are reported in the news.
Source: Miniter, 2005.
Most of the studies on media-induced contagion are dated or focus on areas other than terrorism. Several years ago Allan Mazur (1982) studied bomb threats in the nuclear industry. His study compared bomb threats against nuclear power plants with the amount of press coverage the plants received. He began by noting that news reports of suicides increase the actual number of suicides, and he wondered whether he might find a similar pattern in the nuclear industry. He found that the number of threats proportionately matched the number of news stories. When coverage increased, bomb threats increased. Conversely, when coverage decreased, bomb threats decreased.
One of the first criminal justice scholars to study media contagion was M. Cherif Bassiouni (1981); he felt that media coverage had several contagious effects. He found that media reports promoted fear and magnified threats. This caused fear to spread. The media also influenced the way terrorists selected their targets: to spread violence, terrorists selected targets for maximum publicity. From this standpoint, terrorism was contagious: Media-reported terrorism caused more terrorism.
If Bassiouni was correct, that meant that images influenced behavior. A few years later, research suggested that media images produced emotional behavior, but not in ways that were completely predictable. When exposed to violent images, some people felt immediate sympathy for the victims. They responded with facial grimaces and accompanying body movements. As other images were presented, viewers reported that they felt their level of anxiety and emotion increase. At that point, several different things happened. Some people became angry; others simply turned away (Tamborini, Stiff, and Heidl, 1990). Images influenced behavior, but they did not seem to cause violent behavior contagiously.
More recent research indicates that the effects of media exposure are even more complex. Many researchers believe that the fear generated by media reporting is contagious (Altheide, 2006). When the anthrax attacks that followed the suicide bombers of September 11 were first reported, anxiety soared. As time went on, however, even when the story was extensively reported, anxiety levels were reduced (Berger, Johnson, and Lee, 2003). In addition, news reports did not seem to cause further anthrax attacks. Other findings demonstrate that media reports might inspire a person to engage in terrorism, but so do stories from friends and families (Weatherston and Moran, 2003).
There may be a contagious relationship between a terrorist event and the level of violence in later events. On March 11, 2004, terrorists set off a series of bombs on commuter trains in Madrid. The attack was intended to kill as many people as possible in a spectacular fashion. Ana Lisa Tota (2005) believes that this type of attack is a side effect of mass media reporting. International terrorists have come to understand that their attacks must be spectacular in order to achieve international coverage. In this sense, the level of violence is contagious.
Some researchers believe that if a contagion effect exists, it might be used to counter terrorism. Reports covering effective policing project images of social and political order. Steven Chermak and Alexander Weiss (2006) found this to be the case when examining community policing. News agencies projected positive images of law enforcement efforts and community responses. The same principle could apply to security forces responding to a terrorist attack. Media coverage would show police officials on the scene restoring order and helping victims. This is a positive image that works against terrorism. Yet the story must still be presented. Chermak and Weiss found that after initial reports on successful community policing, reporters moved on to other stories.
It is possible to reach conclusions about the contagion effect in areas outside of terrorism, and one conclusion is that the contagion effect is unknown. Barrie Gunter (2008) has conducted an in-depth historical study of the influence the media has on social aggression and violent behavior. Concern about the impact of images of violence began with movies in the 1920s, and it continues today. Gunter says a variety of researchers approach the topic with a multitude of methodologies, but there are problems inherent in the decades of study. Most models assume that media violence is linked to negative behavior. That model may be acceptable to policy makers, Gunter argues, but it is not acceptable to social scientists.
Other problems in media-induced violence appear with differing methodologies. First, the causal variables are unknown. Researchers do not know, and cannot control, other factors other than the media that might be responsible for violent behavior. Second, consumers may prefer media violence as entertainment while never accepting violent behavior in their everyday life. Third, causal relationships are often oversimplified.
Gunter concludes that studies of the relationship between behavior and media violence need to be longitudinal studies. They need to concentrate on multiple variables and realize that the impact of the media does not take place in a vacuum. Despite the large number of studies, current evidence is not conclusive, and it is often couched in political catchphrases. If Gunter is correct, the contagion effect of the media on terrorism should be examined in the same framework. Currently, very little is known.
longitudinal studies:
In social science, these studies involve examinations of the same subjects over long periods of time.
ANOTHER PERSPECTIVE: Wilkinson’s Analysis of the Media
Paul Wilkinson argues that terrorists must communicate their efforts and they use the media to do so. He concludes the following about the relationship between the media and terrorists:
• Terrorists and the media have an interdependent relationship.
• Terrorist groups have an underground communication system, but they need the mainstream media to spread their messages.
• Mass media serve as the terrorists’ psychological weapon by creating fear and anxiety.
• Terrorists may trap the media into spreading their message.
• The media may inadvertently shift blame for an incident from terrorists to victims or governments.
• Governments benefit when media sources portray the savage cruelty of terrorist groups.
Source: Wilkinson, 1997.
Censorship Debates
Debates over censorship arise because many people assume that acts of terrorism are induced by reckless media coverage and that media outlets provide terrorists with information. This again raises Barrie Gunter’s point about utilizing inconclusive selective evidence. For example, the leader of one media watchdog group says that long-term exposure to media violence causes violent behavior and insensitivity toward victims. He says that the Surgeon General, the American Medical Association, and the National PTA know this to be true (Klite, 2000). Although he advocates internal self-regulation, his logic explains the thought behind censoring the media. The common wisdom is that media coverage of terrorism is harmful; therefore, it must be censored.
Paul Wilkinson (1997) believes that governments face three choices when it comes to maintaining freedom of the press and combating terrorism. A popular position is to assume a laissez-faire attitude. This hands-off approach assumes that market forces will determine the norms. A second choice is censorship, meaning that a governmental agency would have veto power over news reports. A final choice is to let the press regulate itself. Wilkinson says that reporters would not behave in an irresponsible manner if they knew what they could do to avoid aiding terrorists. He notes that governments and security forces seldom provide direction for news organizations (see Another Perspective: Wilkinson’s Analysis of the Media).
The arguments about censorship are heated and deal with core issues of democracy. At the center of the debate is the right to free speech and the essential question: Does free speech necessitate media access to information? The media answers in the affirmative, claiming that the public has a right to know. Critics respond that free speech does not imply unlimited access to information. There is a right to speak; there is no right to know. In another sense, the censorship debate also focuses on truth or factual information. Because terrorists and governments understand that media images are important in terrorism, they both spend great amounts of energy trying to manipulate the media. Regardless, when a democratic government openly censors information, democracy is threatened. Manipulating the media and withholding information are very different from governmental control of the press (see Cram, 2006; Ross, 2007; and Weimann and von Knop, 2008),.
Looking at actions shortly after the United States started its war on terrorism, Doris Graber (2003) summarizes both sides of the argument. She argues that freedom of the press is crucial during times of national crisis, but that is when the media is most vulnerable. She believes that people who seek increased censorship do so by developing strategic arguments based on sloganeering and knowledge of select audiences. These efforts are attempts to manipulate people into supporting censorship by using verbal tactics to make arguments that it seems illogical to disagree with. Officials in the Bush Administration augmented this process by withholding information and encouraging lower-ranking officials to do the same. The Democrats supported this policy up to the 2002 elections.
Graber says several arguments were used in favor of censorship. The first was national security, a powerful excuse used in times of emergency. According to this position, information must be controlled to ensure the survival of the state. Another position was to claim that the public wanted the information withheld. Democratic Senator Joseph Lieberman voiced his support for controlling information, claiming that the American people overwhelmingly supported these governmental efforts. According to this logic, America was fighting a new type of war and some form of censorship was required. Other arguments asked Americans to behave patriotically. Ultimately, governmental officials claimed that they were asking for restraints, not censorship.
According to Graber, mainly journalists presented the anti-censorship view. They cited a variety of governmental mistakes and misdeeds, all hidden under the cover of national security. They condemned governmental officials who fought against the Freedom of Information (FOI) Act. They also argued that terrorism was essentially a war of information. Instead of trying to silence sources, the government should focus efforts on getting out the facts. Finally, every governmental clampdown cast officials in a bad light. The anti-censorship camp reserved its harshest criticism for media outlets that decided to self-censor as a service to the government.
Freedom of Information (FOI) Act:
A law ensuring access to governmental records.
Graber concludes that arguments for and against censorship in times of crisis are as old as warfare. They will not be resolved in the current struggle with terrorism. She also offers her own opinion. The United States is fighting for freedom and democracy, and only an informed public is capable of successfully defending liberty. Editors, she argues, should hold back information to protect citizens and security forces, but those decisions belong to the media, not the government.
Gabriel Weimann (2008) argues that two issues come into play when debating government regulation. First, terrorists use the media, but they have access to their own forms of communication. One of their main tools is the Internet. Second, many analysts have focused on the problem of cyberterrorism, and that emphasis needs to shift. The major problem with the Internet, Weimann says, is the way it is used every day. Terrorists maintain hundreds of websites and use the Internet for research and communication. Counterterrorism should be aimed at learning how terrorists use the Internet and devising methods to thwart their effectiveness.
Weimann says governments may be tempted to censor or regulate the media in the name of security, but this is a dangerous course of action. The foundation of Western democracy is based on free speech and communication. Censorship, regulation, and gathering data from communication threaten the basis of democracy. It does not take much imagination, he says, to see the harm that invasive government operations might have. In the end, censorship could do more to damage freedom than the terrorist attacks themselves.
Self-Check
> Describe issues that affect the way reporters approach terrorism.
> Can terrorism be contagious? Why or why not?
> What might happen if news about terrorism is censored?
CHAPTER TAKE AWAYS
Television and other media shape the way we view terrorism. This creates quite a bit of controversy about the role of the media in reporting terrorism, and it frequently pits reporters against security forces. All sides try to manipulate the media because of its extensive power. This means that there is extensive competition to present a point of view and a news frame, leading to charges of biases from all sides. This is especially true in television because terrorism is a made-for-television drama. Some scholars have called for limited censorship because the media is so powerful.
OBJECTIVE SUMMARY
• Media stories help impact the ways consumers construct social reality. Images of terrorism are frequently simplified, skewing social constructions. A number of scholarly works focus on terrorism and the media, and most agree that reporting magnifies the power of terrorism.
• This frequently creates tension between security forces and the media. Law enforcement and other security forces represent the power of social order, and they are responsible for maintaining governmental authority. Media outlets feel that they are responsible for informing the public and providing a check on governmental power. Despite these differences, media reports tend to show security forces in a favorable light simply because they show them responding to an emergency.
• Both terrorists and security forces seek to manipulate the media by using it as a weapon. In addition, terrorists have found that they can directly control the media by creating their own information outlets. This can backfire because terrorist propaganda frequently contains important intelligence information that can be used by security forces.
• News frames shape stories about terrorism. They set the stage for the story, introduce the characters, give a narrative of the action, and either provide a conclusion or lead consumers to a variety of conclusions.
• There is a special relationship between terrorism and television. Terrorism has a close relationship with television because it provides an unfolding drama. Television news reports are often designed to entertain and excite audiences. Some critics maintain that television reporting focuses more on entertainment than information. New international outlets often provide sympathetic views of terrorism.
• The Internet has a complex relationship with terrorism. It can be used like other media to report an event, but it has many other functions including serving as a means for communication, propaganda, recruiting, and training. It can also be used as a tactical weapon. Information on the World Wide Web can be used for sending embedded messages and as a tool to support an attack.
• Some media commentators believe that there is a liberal bias in television news reporting. Others feel that conservative views dominate the airwaves. There are some networks on cable television that cater to particular political audiences, and they adjust their reports to match the opinions of their viewers. Gender roles are also shaped by the way terrorism is covered. The power of media has prompted some security experts to call for censorship when reporting about terrorism.
• Because many news consumers experience an event only through the media, all forms of media play an important role in the social construction of reality by the ways they provide information.
Critical Engagement: Images, Control, and the Future
In The Packaging of Terrorism, Susan Moeller (2009, pp. 130–133) makes a crucial point about the power of media images. They define how we perceive the world. Firefighters responding to chaos or raising an American flag over the ruins of the World Trade Center convey a powerful message about the U.S. government, and when blended with shots of al Qaeda in the hills of Afghanistan, they say a lot about an enemy as well. Images also present media outlets with several issues, including the ways to cover live terrorists attacks, how to respond to terrorism, and how to use video created by terrorists. The resulting images change diplomatic relations, foreign policy, the powers of government, and the course of history.
Perception of images defines the way violence is interpreted. Brigitte Nacos (2008) says that the press has always been interested in reporting violence; but the multitude of television channels, radio stations, and large media conglomerates understand their audiences’ lust for shocking stories and sensationalized violence. Terrorism must be reported in a free society, but, she asks, how far should it go? Should there be limits on reporting?
Sensationalism is rampant. After terrorist bombings in Madrid killed nearly 200 people in 2004, one national news magazine ran a picture of mutilated bodies on its front cover. Television stations showed the same explosive attacks over and over again until one or two explosions took on the aura of an artillery barrage. Nacos cites other incidents, such as a leading newspaper’s account of a terrorist video in which a weeping victim from the West is beheaded by a knife-wielding jihadist. Regarding another video of a beheading, she criticizes a reporter’s description of a terrorist video as if it were a movie review. These graphic images and descriptions should not be reported by responsible journalists, Nacos concludes.
In the past, media outlets were bound by national borders. This has changed with the growth of networks like al Jazeera and al Manar. Media outlets now compete in a global market, and Nacos says these factors give terrorists an upper hand. For example, Nacos refers to a 2002 takeover of a Moscow theater by Chechen terrorists. When the takeover was complete, the Chechens delivered a prepackaged video tape, but not to Russian television networks. They presented it to the Moscow bureau of al Jazeera. Although the Russians censored their own networks, Russians and everyone else watched the drama unfold on global networks.
The Internet has made the situation more complicated. Terrorists now operate with their own media advisors and production centers. Al Qaeda created the Global Islamic Media Front and launched its own weekly Internet television show. The show featured a news anchor and reports from Afghanistan, Iraq, Gaza, and Sudan. If media outlets do not show horrific violence, Nacos concludes, terrorists will broadcast it themselves.
Consider these issues in terms of future developments:
• There is a debate about censorship, but will censorship control the images of terrorism as they are presented in the media? Will internal broadcasting standards have any impact?
• How will terrorists continue to use the Internet as a source of propaganda? Should censorship be introduced on the Internet because of this?
• Images of terrorism increase anger and anxiety. Would images of security forces responding to terrorism create different feelings? How might politicians take advantage of emotions evoked by images of terrorism?
KEY TERMS
news media, p. 4-87
embedded reporters, p. 4-90
news frames, p. 4-91
reporting frame, p. 4-91
postmodern, p. 4-92
infotainment telesector, p. 4-93
made-for-TV drama, p. 4-94
al Jazeera, p. 4-95
al Manar, p. 4-95
al Aqsa Intifada, p. 4-95
steganography, p. 4-97
Salafi movement, p. 4-97
critical media consciousness, p. 4-101
copycats, p. 4-102
longitudinal studies, p. 4-104
Freedom of Information (FOI) Act, p. 4-105
(White 86)
White. ACP Terrorism and Homeland Security w/CourseMate-Globe, 8th Edition. Cengage Learning, 06/2013. VitalBook file.
The citation provided is a guideline. Please check each citation for accuracy before use.
PLACE THIS ORDER OR A SIMILAR ORDER WITH US TODAY AND GET AN AMAZING DISCOUNT 🙂